Uncategorized – Georgetown University Undergraduate Law Review

The Infamous, Wildly Misunderstood Hot Coffee Case

Posted on March 1, 2023 by guulr in Uncategorized

Andrew Sturgeon is a junior in the College, where he majors in Government and Psychology. Born and raised in the San Francisco Bay Area, Andrew is an avid athlete, gym goer, and board game enthusiast. He is currently a Blog Writer for the Georgetown University Undergraduate Law Review.

In 1992, Stella Liebeck sued McDonald’s after suffering third-degree burns from spilled takeout coffee that she had ordered from the drive-through.^[1] Now known as the “hot coffee case,” Liebeck’s action is chastised by many as an egregious example of a frivolous lawsuit. To an uninitiated observer, it may seem that Ms. Liebeck capitalized on a silly mistake to swindle the fast food giant out of millions.^[2] How could somebody sue a franchise because the hot coffee they ordered was hot? However, the “hot coffee case” is as infamous as it is misunderstood. A thorough assessment of the case reveals that Liebeck was not a trickster but a victim, and McDonald’s was not innocent but rather egregiously culpable for Liebeck’s burns and subsequent suffering.

First, it is essential to define the verifiable facts of the case, as well as how they differ from the common narrative. On a February morning in 1992 Albuquerque, 79-year old widow Stella Liebeck sat in the passenger seat of her grandson’s car in the McDonald’s drive-thru ordering a meal. After receiving their food, along with one hot coffee, the two pulled into a parking spot to eat. These simple contextual facts already contradict the poisoned popular narrative, which often holds that Liebeck sat in the driver’s seat of a moving vehicle when she spilled her coffee due to negligence. In reality, Liebeck was in the passenger seat of a motionless vehicle. Since the car did not have cup holders, Liebeck placed her takeout cup in between her legs. While removing the lid to add cream and sugar, Liebeck spilled the coffee on her lap, sending her body into immediate shock and covering her thighs and pelvic area with third degree burns. Liebeck was immediately taken to a hospital where she remained for a week, undergoing multiple skin graft surgeries, debridement, and whirlpool therapy. Liebeck would continue to suffer from chronic pain and disability for the rest of her life.

When Liebeck’s legal team demanded $20,000 to cover her medical expenses, McDonald’s countered, offering a mere $800 and sending the case to trial. Liebeck sued on the grounds that McDonald’s knowingly sold a defective product that violated the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness as per Sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code.^[3] Under the implied warranty of merchantability, a vendor assumes liability for a defective product that cannot be used for its normal purpose.^[4] As per the warranty of fitness, if a seller is cognizant of a buyer’s intended purpose for their product, the seller must guarantee that the product they sell is fit for such a purpose.

As it applies to the case at hand, Liebeck’s claims were twofold: first, that she had been sold defective coffee that could not serve its expected or normal purpose, and second, that such a defect had caused her severe injury.

Despite popular belief, these claims were well-founded and backed by the facts of the case. Crucially, the coffee sold to Liebeck was not merely hot; it was scalding. As revealed by employee testimony, McDonald’s intentionally kept its coffee between 180 and 190º Fahrenheit. The sale of McDonald’s coffee at this temperature was no malfunction or mistake; it was the codified corporate standard. Experts noted that a mere second of contact with liquid at this temperature is sufficient to cause third degree burns.^[5] Critically, McDonald’s could not plead ignorance to this biological fact. Prior to Liebeck’s accident, the fast food giant had already been made aware of over 700 unique incidents involving coffee induced burns over the previous decade.^[6] McDonald’s own quality assurance manager testified that “at that high temperature the coffee is a hazard.”^[7]

What, then, was the defense provided by McDonald’s for selling their coffee at such ludicrous, hazardous temperatures? The fast food giant offered two core rationalizations, though neither were particularly compelling. First, McDonald’s asserted that coffee at 190º Fahrenheit has a superior taste, and thus was serving its normal and expected purpose. But of what importance is the taste of a liquid that cannot safely be tasted? Testimony established that it is medically indisputable that coffee at this temperature is simply undrinkable. As such, its taste is irrelevant. Second, McDonald’s offered a familiar yet juvenile contention: hotness is an inextricable characteristic of hot coffee, and thus customers cannot sue on the grounds of its temperature. McDonald’s testified that market research had told them that customers “want hot coffee, they want it steamy hot, and they expect to get it that way.”^[8] However, it would be preposterous to assert that a customer’s desire for heat trumps their desire for a safe, drinkable liquid. Further, such an argument disregards the wide range encompassed by the descriptor “hot.” Yes, coffee is typically hot, but so is the surface of the sun. Thus, the mere label of “hot”—with no further specification—is an entirely inadequate warning of the severe health hazard posed by a liquid at 190º Fahrenheit. Consumers simply cannot be reasonably expected to assume that “hot” really means “dangerously scalding.”

Unsurprisingly, the jury was not convinced of McDonalds’ rather hollow defense; the fast food giant failed to defend the merchantability and fitness of its product. Liebeck was awarded $2.86 million in damages, but the two parties later entered a post-verdict settlement for an undisclosed amount.

The fast food giant would take swift but silent action upon conclusion of the case—just a day after the verdict, it was reported that the Albuquerque McDonald’s, where Liebeck suffered her injuries, was selling its hot coffee at a much safer 158º Fahrenheit. The cups were also labeled with a far more extensive and descriptive temperature warning

It would also quickly become evident that McDonald’s PR team was far better equipped than its legal department. The fast food giant wasted no time in embarking upon a thorough smear campaign aimed at excusing itself from culpability and painting Liebeck as the money-hungry villain. Over the next few months, through a calculated series of press releases and statements to the media, McDonald’s worked tirelessly to distort public perception of the fundamental facts of Liebeck’s case. Tragically, they were successful, and Liebeck was made the poster child of the “frivolous lawsuit” phenomenon. CBS News Anchor Andy Rooney remarked that the case was proof that “suing has become a popular American pastime.”^[9] Following Liebeck’s passing, TIME Magazine sarcastically lamented that she “didn’t live to see the addition of iced coffee to the McDonald’s menu.”^[10] As the media continued to mock a justified lawsuit, the facts of the case were quickly swept aside. Even lawmakers bought into such disinformation. Former Ohio Representative John Kasich argued that Liebeck’s case “in itself is enough to tell you why we need tort reform.”^[11] Perhaps the most egregious example, columnist Randy Cassingham created the “Stella Awards” in Liebeck’s name, a book series dedicated to “ridiculous” and “bogus” cases.^[12]

The true story is the one far less told. Judy Allen, Liebeck’s daughter, remarked that her mother had lost all quality of life following her injuries, and the settlement money merely paid for her medical bills and a live-in nurse. Yet Liebeck is continuously presented as a conniving tactician who exploited the legal system to “win big.” Ultimately, what could have been celebrated as an advancement of corporate accountability was instead chastised as a deplorable reflection of flaws in our legal system. Such a discrepancy cements this case as one of the most shameful stains on legal discourse.

[1] Liebeck v. McDonald’s Restaurants, 1995 WL 360309 (1994).

[2] Elizabeth Gam, Stella Liebeck vs. McDonald’s Restaurants, H2O (May 29, 2018), https://h2o.law.harvard.edu/text_blocks/30812

[3] U.C.C §§ 2-314, 2-315

[4] Emilie McGuire & Jeffrey Skinner, The Coffee Case Revisited, ARENTFOX SCHIFF (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.afslaw.com/perspectives/product-liability-mass-torts-blog/the-hot-coffee-case-revisited-has-proximate-cause#:~:text=In%201994%2C%20Liebeck%20v.,spilled%20McDonald%27s%20coffee%20on%20herself.

[5] General Data About Burns, BURN CENTRE CARE, http://burncentrecare.co.uk/about_burned_skin.html.

[6] The McDonald’s Hot Coffee Case, CONSUMER ATTORNEYS OF CALIFORNIA, https://www.caoc.org/?pg=facts.

[7] Kevin G. Cain, The McDonald’s Coffee Lawsuit, 11 J. Consumer & Com. L. 14 (2007).

[8] Greenlee, Kramer v. Java World, 26 CAP. U. L. REV. at 720-21.

[9] Andy Simmons, Remember the Hot Coffee Lawsuit? It Changed the Way McDonald’s Heats Coffee Forever, READER’S DIGEST (Jul. 15, 2021), https://www.rd.com/article/hot-coffee-lawsuit/.

[10] Top 10 Outrageous Legal Battles, TIME, https://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,1899500_1899502_1899510,00.html.

[11] Id.

[12] Randy Cassingham, All True Cases, STELLA AWARDS, https://stellaawards.com/.

The Supreme Court, Educational Affirmative Action, and Its Unfortunate Likely Demise

Posted on February 22, 2023February 22, 2023 by guulr in Uncategorized

Kirit Minhas is a junior in the College, where he majors in English Literature and minors in Journalism and French. He is currently a Blog Writer for the Georgetown University Undergraduate Law Review.

On March 6, 1961, President John F. Kennedy signed Executive Order 10925 which directed federal contractors to take “affirmative action to ensure that applicants are treated equally without regard to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”^[1] This measure introduced the institution known in the United States today as affirmative action, which is used today to protect and empower diverse hiring practices within education and career opportunities that are supported by the federal government. Three years later, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law, which prohibited the discrimination of employees by companies larger than fifteen employees. In 1965, he also issued Executive Order 11246, requiring all government contractors and subcontractors to take affirmative action to create more job opportunities for minorities.^[2]

While not explicitly laid out in the executive orders, affirmative action quickly assumed a pivotal role at institutions of higher education in the United States. Racial quotas began to take shape as universities worked to recruit minority students to their campuses; this controversial practice led to litigation from white applicants who felt they were being unfairly discriminated against. One such landmark case, the first in a long series of challenges to the practice of affirmative action at the Supreme Court, was Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. In this case, a white student named Allan Bakke brought a case against the University of California (UC) system after he was twice denied admission to UC Davis’ medical school, despite having higher test scores than admitted minority students.^[3] After the California Supreme Court ruled in his favor, the UC system appealed to the Supreme Court.

UC Davis School of Medicine utilized a racial quota system, reserving 16 out of 100 spots for minority students each year. The central question in this case was whether this system violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause in denying Bakke admission. The ruling ultimately set the precedent for the affirmative action practices we see today. Authored by Justice F. Powell Jr., the opinions upheld the principle of affirmative action but overturned UC Davis’s specific racial quota practice. In his opinion, Justice Powell writes that “the diversity that furthers a compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and characteristics, of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single, though important, element.”^[4] This is the essential holding of the ruling—race may be used in what is now known as holistic admissions, but only as one of several broad factors determining diversity on a college campus. Altogether, the opinions written by Powell upheld the right of the university system to use holistic race-based admissions practices while striking down the specificity of the quota system as unconstitutional.

In several challenges since then, affirmative action has been upheld repeatedly, albeit in a rather lukewarm fashion by the nation’s highest court. In 2003, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote for the majority in a narrowly divided 5-4 court in the case of Grutter v. Bollinger. The case, which involved a highly qualified applicant being rejected from University of Michigan Law School, ultimately yielded an opinion that upheld the constitutionality of affirmative action while further narrowing its usage.^[5] O’Connor wrote in her opinion that race must be treated on an individual basis for each applicant, and further limited the scope of affirmative action by arguing that “The Court expects that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”^[6] Affirmative action continued to be challenged at the Supreme Court again in the cases Fisher v. University of Texas (2013) and Fisher v. University of Texas (2016), which is commonly referred to as Fisher II. The justices essentially deferred a decision in 2013 by sending the case back to the lower court. But in Fisher II, the justices upheld that race-based affirmative action was protected by the 14th Amendment, leading to virtually no change.

With President Trump appointing three conservative justices to the Supreme Court, the makeup of the court has changed drastically in the years since affirmative action was challenged. Within this current conservative supermajority, the conservative justices have judicial records of being hostile toward affirmative action. Thus, a pair of cases against the University of Carolina and Harvard University seem to be the final nails in the coffin of the practice.

It is important to reflect on the impacts that a ban on affirmative action can have on educational institutions and their diversity. Affirmative action bans have been upheld on statewide levels via referendums in states like California and Michigan. Research conducted by David Mickey-Pabello as part of the UCLA Civil Rights Project shows that these bans have not exactly yielded the results that they promised. Racial and ethnic diversity has decreased by 26% for Black students and 19% for Hispanic students between 1996, the year when California banned affirmative action, and 2012. The SAT scores of those admitted students have also declined, on average, in both the math and verbal sections.^[7]

Overall, these bans have negatively impacted diversity and academic excellence, while also producing other negative implications. These include decreasing applications from underrepresented minority students and lower numbers of underrepresented minorities entering the pipeline for graduate and professional studies. This further diminishes the diversity of the faculty at universities, perpetuating a negative feedback loop for underrepresented minorities in higher education.^[8] While the history of affirmative action in the United States in our judicial system is complicated, it is important to realize the real-life impacts that its ban could hold on its future in many aspects of our society. The “compelling interest” that Justice Powell wrote of in 1978 has not dissipated in the years since he penned his opinion, nor has it in the 20 years since Justice O’Connor wrote her majority opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger.

^[1] Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (Mar. 8, 1961).

^[2] Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sep. 28, 1965).

^[3] Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/1979/76-811.

^[4] Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978).

^[5]Grutter v. Bollinger, 538 U.S. 306, 310 (2003), Retrieved from Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2002/02-241.

^[6]Id.

^[7]David Mickey-Pabello, Scholarly findings on affirmative action bans, UCLA Civil Rights Project (Oct. 26, 2020), https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED609274.

^[8]Id.

Making the War Powers Resolution a Justiciable Issue

Posted on January 25, 2022 by guulr in Spring 2022, Uncategorized

Jack Little is a senior in the School of Foreign Service majoring in international politics and minoring in Spanish and philosophy and an Assistant Editor for GUULR

In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution (WPR), providing itself with new statutory powers to oversee the president’s use of the military.[1] The WPR requires the president to notify Congress within 48 hours of introducing armed forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances.”[2] Absent certain extenuating circumstances, the president must then withdraw military forces within 60 days unless Congress has approved of the president’s action.[3] At first glance, this congressional approval requirement is simple and allows for judicial intervention given presidential noncompliance. However, courts have generally held that such cases involve political questions outside the judiciary’s jurisdiction and are thus nonjusticiable.[4] For example, an opinion in Campbell v. Clinton decided this issue was nonjusticiable.[5] As a result, consequential disagreements about the use of armed forces go unresolved and Congress cannot enforce its power under the WPR to approve the use of armed forces. In this essay, I will argue that although the Campbell opinion was properly decided as nonjusticiable, a simple but necessary amendment to the WPR would quash these concerns and make violations of the WPR’s congressional approval requirement justiciable.

In Campbell, Congressman Tom Campbell and twenty-five other members of the House argued that President Clinton violated the WPR by using armed forces in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia without congressional approval.[6] Although the D.C. Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ lawsuit primarily on lack of standing, Judge Silberman also opined that the case was not justiciable, as “the statutory threshold standard is not precise enough and too obviously calls for a political judgment.”[7] The threshold standard Judge Silberman refers to is whether armed forces face hostilities or imminent hostilities, which would trigger the congressional approval requirement under the WPR.[8]

Judge Silberman’s reasoning here invokes the political question doctrine as established in Baker v. Carr.[9] The political question doctrine refers to the principle that the judicial branch does not have jurisdiction over issues of an inherently political nature because of “a court’s impotence to correct that violation.”[10] In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan described six ways in which an issue could violate the political question doctrine, one of which is “a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.”[11] Issues that would require courts to create inherently political standards fall outside their jurisdiction. He also analyzed judicial precedence and found that the “lack of judicially discoverable standards … may impel reference to the political departments’ determination of dates of hostilities’ beginning and ending.”[12] In other words, courts cannot determine when hostilities have begun or ended because this requires an inherently political determination reserved for the legislative and executive branches of government. More intuitively, how could courts possibly decide whether armed forces face hostilities or imminent hostilities given their limited military and national security expertise? Therefore, Judge Silberman was correct that the standard triggering the congressional approval requirement under the WPR is nonjusticiable.

This is not to say, however, that courts can never decide on when hostilities have occurred. Indeed, Justice Brennan included the caveat in Baker that “clearly definable criteria for decision may be available. In such case the political question barrier falls away.”[13] It stands to reason, then, that the WPR’s congressional approval requirement could be justiciable if the statutory threshold were more precise than the presence of hostilities or imminent hostilities

I, therefore, propose a simple amendment to the WPR. As it currently stands, the president is required to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours of introducing the armed forces:

(1) into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances; (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or (3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation.[14]

In this way, the WPR requires notification of Congress in situations other than which armed forces face hostilities or imminent hostilities. These other two situations—those in which armed forces enter foreign territory or substantially increase their presence abroad—are justiciable, as they meet the “clearly definable criteria” caveat to the political question doctrine under Baker.[15] Courts could determine whether these standards have been met without making political determinations outside their jurisdiction. Congressional approval, however, is only required after 60 days of armed forces facing hostilities or imminent hostilities, not for the latter two situations.[16] Therefore, Congress could amend the WPR to require congressional approval in any of the three situations in which the president is already required to notify Congress of military action. Doing so would quash the justiciability concerns presented in the Campbell and Baker cases.[17]

More importantly, this proposal would benefit U.S. national security and democracy. First, allowing courts to intervene in issues related to the WPR’s congressional approval requirement would strengthen Congress’s ability to approve armed conflict. This would, in turn, improve the long-term national security strategy because “robust checks on presidential unilateralism help ensure that a chosen strategic path can withstand tough scrutiny.”[18] After all, the Constitution gives Congress the power to fund the military and declare war, distinct from the president’s power as commander in chief, implying a role for Congress in the country’s use of armed forces.[19] Moreover, the WPR’s purpose was to “insure that the collective judgment of both the Congress and the President will apply to the” use of armed forces.[20] This proposal would thus help fulfill this purpose and strengthen the constitutional system of checks and balances.

Second, this proposal would make congressional authorization under the WPR a legal issue, allowing the president to be held accountable outside solely political processes like elections or impeachment. These political processes cannot remedy situations in the short term, potentially leading to significant loss of life or harm to national security. Allowing Congress to hold the president accountable through the legal process, however, can more rapidly remedy violations of the WPR.[NR1]

I have shown why violations of the WPR’s congressional approval requirement are currently nonjusticiable according to the political question doctrine. However, the political question doctrine also includes a caveat for defining hostilities, in which precise criteria would make this a justiciable issue. The U.S. should therefore amend the WPR to take advantage of this caveat and improve the country’s national security and democracy.

[1] War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1550 (2018).

[2] Id. §1543(a)(1)

[3] Id. §1544(b)

[4] Louis Fisher, “The Law: Litigating the War Power with Campbell v. Clinton,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 30, no. 3 (09, 2000): 567, https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/law-litigating-war-power-with-campbell-v-clinton/docview/215688524/se-2?accountid=11091.

[5] Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

[6]Id..

[7] Id. at 24-25.

[8] War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1) (2018); War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2018).

[9] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

[10] Id. at 5.

[11] Id. at 12.

[12] Id. at 11.

[13] Id.

[14] War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a)(1)-(a)(3) (2018).

[15] Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 11 (1962).

[16] War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2018).

[17] Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).

[18] Jack Landman Goldsmith and Matthew C. Waxman, “The Legal Legacy of Light-Footprint Warfare,” The Washington Quarterly 39 (2016): 18, https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/goldsmith_and_waxman.pdf.

[19] U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 11-12.

[20] War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2018).

Bibliography:

Fisher, Louis. “The Law: Litigating the War Power with Campbell v. Clinton.” Presidential

Studies Quarterly 30, no. 3 (09, 2000): 564-574. https://www.proquest.com/scholarly-journals/law-litigating-war-power-with-campbell-v-clinton/docview/215688524/se-2?accountid=11091.

Goldsmith, Jack Landman and Matthew C. Waxman. “The Legal Legacy of Light-Footprint Warfare.” The Washington Quarterly 39 (2016): 21-7. https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/goldsmith_and_waxman.pdf

DOES THE STATE SECRETS DOCTRINE REQUIRE A SECRET?

Posted on November 10, 2021February 17, 2022 by guulr in Blog Fall 2021, Uncategorized

Lauren Scarff is a senior in the School of Foreign Service majoring in International Politics. She is currently the Editor-in-Chief for the Georgetown University Undergraduate Law Review.

On October 6th, 2021, the Supreme Court heard United States v. Zubaydah, a peculiar case that calls into question, among other pertinent national security law issues, the state secrets doctrine. Abu Zubaydah is a Palestinian man who was captured in Pakistan in 2002 under suspicion of being a top al-Qaeda leader. Although the CIA concluded in 2006 that Zubaydah is not a member of al-Qaeda, Zubaydah has remained in U.S. custody, primarily in Guantanamo Bay, since 2002.^[1] This case, however, centers not on Pakistan, Cuba, or Guantanamo, but Poland. The European Court of Human Rights determined that, from December 2002 to September 2003, Zubaydah was held at a CIA black site located in Poland where he was subjected to waterboarding 83 times, locked in a small box for hundreds of hours, denied sleep, and forced to remain in stress positions. Polish officials are now investigating whether any Polish nationals were complicit in Zubaydah’s torture and, if so, to what extent. Pursuant to their investigation, Abu Zubaydah, his lawyers, and Polish prosecutors want to subpoena CIA contractors James Mitchell and John Jessen, but the federal government has blocked the subpoena by invoking the state secrets doctrine.^[2]^[3]

The state secrets doctrine was first established in United States v. Reynolds, and it holds that government information should remain secret and not be revealed during litigation, even if the claimant has a right to that information, when “there is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged.”^[4] Given Zubaydah’s case hinges on information about top secret CIA black sites and torture methods, at first glance, it appears that the precedent set by Reynolds would clearly apply here. Zubaydah’s case is peculiar, though, because the information he seeks from the government is not actually secret. In 2014, the Senate Intelligence Committee released an unclassified executive summary of a report on the CIA’s use of torture. In this unclassified executive summary, Zubaydah’s name is mentioned 1,343 times, and the summary details Zubaydah’s torture.^[5] The question is thus raised, does invoking the state secrets doctrine require a secret?

Part of the government’s argument hinges on the fact that the CIA has never confirmed or denied much of the information Zubaydah seeks. Therefore, the government argues that, without express government disclosure, information that appears to be public knowledge can still qualify as a state secret. In particular, the government argues that testimony from Mitchell and Jessen could jeopardize “clandestine liaison relationships,” likely referring to relationships with those foreign nationals aware of or operating within the Polish black site, which in turn could threaten other clandestine relationships and security services. The government claims that exposing these relationships could pose a threat to national security. In the government’s petition for a writ of certiorari, it chastised the Ninth Circuit opinion, which ruled in Zubaydah’s favor, for not showing proper deference to the government’s assessment of national security risks and what is or is not considered public information.^[6] The government’s argument is bolstered by the fact that it seems that some of the information Zubaydah may want has not yet been made public. For instance, the exact location of the Polish black site and if any Polish nationals were operating in that black site.

However, Zubaydah’s lawyers claim that Polish prosecutors do not seek specific information on the Polish black site that has not already been made public. When asked what information the Polish prosecutors seek, Zubaydah’s lawyer replied “What he [the Polish prosecutor] does need to know is what happened inside Abu Zubaydah’s cell between December 2002 and September 2003. So I want to ask simple questions like, how was Abu Zubaydah fed? What was his medical condition? What was his cell like? And, yes, was he tortured?”^[7] In essence, Zubaydah, his lawyers, and the Polish prosecutors want further detail on already public information, but supposedly do not seek classified information that has not already been made public in some manner.

The government’s insistence in this case on invoking the state secrets doctrine to protect already public information seems to signal an abuse in the government’s use of the state secrets doctrine. The Court has historically granted great deference to the government when it claims that certain information must be protected under the state secrets doctrine.^[8] In fact, the mention of information potentially being a threat to national security effectively muzzles anyone seeking that information. In Zubaydah’s case, the government raises valid concerns about the potential for actual classified information to be released should the state secrets doctrine not be enforced, but if Zubaydah genuinely seeks only further details on already public information, the government’s claim to the privilege of the state secrets doctrine seems absurd. The relentless efforts from the government to protect already public information begs the question, what other information has the government suppressed in the name of state secrets and national security that perhaps should not fall under those privileges?

The Court may not issue an opinion on the government’s use of the state secrets doctrine and whether the doctrine requires an actual secret, as Justices Gorsuch, Sotomayor, and Breyer have asked if Zubaydah himself could testify and provide the information the Polish prosecutors seek.^[9] This move would be unprecedented, as Guantanamo detainees’ communications are highly restricted due to security concerns. However, it could provide a compromise that does not require the Court to determine if the government can quash the subpoenas to Mitchell and Jessen in the name of the state secrets doctrine. If Zubaydah testifies to his own torture, the alleged state secrets that would be contained in Mitchell and Jessen’s testimony would not be made public, and the Polish prosecutors could obtain the information they seek. On October 15^th, 2021, the government issued a letter to the Supreme Court noting that the Biden administration would allow Zubaydah to provide limited testimony to Polish prosecutors.^[10] Zubaydah awaits the court’s decision to see if his testimony will, in fact, be the solution to this complex state secrets issue.

^[1] Rohini Kurup, Supreme Court to Hear State Secrets Case Involving Guantanamo Detainee, Lawfare (June 10, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-hear-state-secrets-case-involving-guantanamo-detainee.

^[2] Robert Barnes, Supreme Court considers whether information widely known can be state secret, Washington Post (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-guantanamo-zubaydah/2021/10/05/9546913e-261d-11ec-8d53-67cfb452aa60_story.html.

^[3] Ian Millhiser, The Supreme Court confronts the CIA’s worst-kept secret, Vox (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.vox.com/2021/10/6/22701048/supreme-court-torture-cia-abu-zubaydah-state-secrets-guantanamo-united-states.

^[4] United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).

^[5] Millhiser, supra note 3.

^[6] Kurup, supra note 1.

^[7] Barnes, supra note 2.

^[8] Kurup, supra note 1.

^[9] Amy Howe, Argument over state secrets and CIA black sites takes unexpected turn in final few minutes, SCOTUSblog (Oct. 6, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/10/argument-over-state-secrets-and-cia-black-sites-takes-unexpected-turn-in-final-few-minutes/.

^[10] Ariane de Vogue, Biden admin tells Supreme Court that Guantanamo detainee can provide limited testimony, CNN (Oct. 17, 2021), https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/17/politics/biden-supreme-court-abu-zubaydah-guantanamo/index.html.

Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc

Posted on February 5, 2021 by guulr in Blog Spring 2021, GUULR Blog, Uncategorized

BY: Maya Valliath

Maya Valliath is a sophomore in the College studying mathematics and political economy. She is currently an assistant editor for the Georgetown University Undergraduate Law Review.

On October 7, 2020, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments for a case that has been in the making for over a decade. In 2005, after Google’s negotiations with Sun Microsystems, an American software company, to use its Java API in its Android platform fell through, Google proceeded to use Java’s API in its platform without a license. When Oracle acquired Sun Microsystems in 2010, Oracle sued Google for copyright infringement and years of appeals have ensued.^[1]

The case heard before the Supreme Court in October sought to settle whether or not the use of Java’s API fell under the exclusive rights of Oracle and whether copyright law protected “a software interface” as a whole.^[2]

Google’s Argument

A central theme of the hearing was addressing whether or not the ubiquity of Java’s API conferred fair use rights. Thomas C. Goldstein, representing Google, relied on Section 102(b) of US Code law, which states:

In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.^[3]

Goldstein essentially argued that the Java API is a non-creative method of operation that can be used to make creative products, and therefore Oracle does not have the right to control who expresses its API.^[4] The 1880 Baker v. Selden case, which crystalized the idea-expression dichotomy in copyright law, was also heavily referenced in the hearing:

The copyright protection for a book explaining an art or system extends only to the author’s unique explanation of it and does not prevent others from using the system or the forms incidentally used.^[5]

By framing Oracle’s Java API as a method of operating, Goldstein argued that Oracle does not have the exclusive right to the use of its API. Justices likened the use of the API to using a QWERTY keyboard; something that if its expression was protected by copyright, would have detrimental consequences for the consumers of several industries and generally hamper productivity and innovation.^[6]

Oracle’s Argument

Oracle’s representation, E. Joshua Rosenkranz, outlined two legal principles to argue that Google’s use of the Java API did not constitute fair use. Rosenkranz first stated:

Congress defined literary work to include software and granted copyright protection as long as the code is original. Google conceded Oracle’s code is original. That’s the end of the question.^[7]

Rosenkranz went on to argue that Google’s use of the Java API in its own Android software served the exact same purpose that it did in Java. Rosenkranz also made sure to point out that other companies have paid millions of dollars to license the use of Oracle’s Java API. Echoing Justice Alito, he also made clear that major competitors of Google’s, such as Apple, do not use the Java API and have invested billions of dollars to create their own original software, emphasizing that software development as a whole does not rely on Oracle’s Java API. He argued that by granting Google fair use rights because the API was ubiquitous in the software industry, and consequently denying Oracle licensing rights, Oracle was being punished for its innovation and brilliance. Following up on the QWERTY metaphor, Rosenkranz articulated that the burden of innovation would not fall on consumers, a worry of the Justices, but rather on “independent economic actors.” In response to Goldstein’s comment that the Java API was uncreative, Rosenkranz argued that the complexity of the API made it so that it was inherently creative.^[8]

Implications of the Upcoming Decision

As the software industry eagerly awaits the SCOTUS outcome, two important factors hang in the balance. It boils down to an almost principal economic problem: how does the government simultaneously lower barriers to entry for innovation while also incentivizing it? On one hand, Google argued several times that siding with Oracle would stifle productivity and innovation in the software industry, forcing developers to reinvent the wheel. On the other hand, Oracle argued that by making its Java API free to use without licensing rights and copyright protections, it would disincentivize the creation of better or newer technologies because their creation would no longer be profitable.

^[1]Google LLC v. Oracle America, Inc.: The Supreme Court Considers the “Copyright Lawsuit of the Decade”, Harvard Journal of Law & Technology (2020), https://jolt.law.harvard.edu/digest/google-llc-v-oracle-america-inc-the-supreme-court-considers-the-copyright-lawsuit-of-the-decade (last visited Jan 4, 2021).

^[2]Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/18-956 (last visited Jan 3, 2021).

^[3]17 U.S. Code § 102 – Subject matter of copyright: In general, Legal Information Institute (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/17/102 (last visited Jan 4, 2021).

^[4]Google LLC v. Oracle America Inc, Oyez, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/18-956 (last visited Jan 3, 2021).

^[5] Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 25 L. Ed. 841, 1879 U.S. LEXIS 1888, 11 Otto 99 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1880).

^[6] Idem.

^[7] Idem.

^[8] Idem.

Criminology of Stone Pelting During COVID-19 in India

Posted on September 16, 2020December 12, 2020 by guulr in Blog Fall 2020, GUULR Blog, Uncategorized

By: AARUSHI KAPOOR and SSANJNNA GUPTA

Aarushi Kapoor is a third year student of Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. She has interests in Humanitarian law, International Laws and Corporate laws.

Ssanjnna Gupta is a third year student of Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur. She has interests in International Law, Constitutional Law and Alternative Dispute Resolution.

Largest unplanned national lockdown

India, a country with the second largest population in the world, imposed a nation-wide lockdown to cure the coronavirus among its citizens.^[1] However, such a last-minute imposition of a lockdown was entirely unplanned. This decision has hit hard upon the lives of migrant workers who have realized the indifference of the authorities. The lack of responsiveness led to a situation wherein these migrant workers had to undertake a journey on foot to reach their hometowns from the bigger cities they were trapped in.^[2] They struggled for basic needs like food, shelter, and employment and such a deprivation has resulted in the death of more than 400 migrant workers up to this point.^[3] Some have died because of hunger while some in road accidents. As a consequence, a protest movement has developed within the migrant worker community.^[4]

Criminal act presupposes Criminal intent

While the Government plans to build a self-reliant nation, at the same time it seems equally reluctant to exhaust its resources upon the force which drives the nation i.e. labour-force.^[5] The rift has widened to the extent that these laborers have come down upon pelting stones at the police. There have been reported instances of stone pelting by the migrant workers at the police and passers-by. Supposed examples of this include a busy road connecting IIM-Ahmedabad with vastrapur, the Palam Vihar of Gurugram, and the premises of IIT Hyderabad in Telangana.^[6] In response, the State Governments are resorting to various penal provisions under the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”).^[7] Section 307 is one of the various sections which is being invoked to try such alleged offenses as attempted murder. ^[8]

To determine whether the Government’s response is legally justified, it is important to question whether these alleged instances of stone pelting by the migrants legally qualifies as attempted-murder in any circumstance.For conviction under Section 307, all the ingredients of murder except death have to be proven.^[9] The mens rea required for attempted murder is the same as that of murder under Section 300.^[10] The burden of proof falls on the prosecution to prove that the act was done with the intention or knowledge of causing death or such bodily injury that the accused knew was likely to cause the death of that person,^[11] or that the act done is so imminently dangerous that in all probability it will result in death.^[12]

Given these legislative requirements, prosecuting these migrant workers under Section 307 for the act of stone is unjust.t The knowledge requirement in Section 300 (from which Section 307 is derived) is absent in this case because it requires a prior knowledge of some peculiar physical condition” of the victim.^[13] One cannot prudently expect the migrant workers who needed to reach their hometowns to have gathered knowledge about the physical conditions of the policemen whom they attacked in the heat of the moment. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that any prosecution under Section 307 requires a twofold probe. In order for the act of stone pelting to amount to attempted to murder, has to satisfy this probe, which requires that it should be intentional and grievous enough to cause death. The act of stone pelting in the first instance did not injure the policemen in such a way that it would inevitably and in all circumstances cause death. Even for once in a distant interpretation, the stone pelting might be considered as either likely to cause death, however, the very act as illustrated in the present scenario can never be intentional. It is devoid of mala-fides.

Every criminal act requires the element of mens rea.^[14] The migrant workers never had the intention to murder the policemen. Pelting stones at the police was a reaction to the discontentment they have been going through to survive the mismanagement of the government during this pandemic.^[15] The migrant workers preferred making the stone a symbol of powerless anger.^[16]

In consonance with this interpretation there has been a recent order by the Bombay High Court in Karan Nair v. State of Maharashtra wherein a man who attacked police for being asked to wear a mask was released due to absence of any criminal intention to attack the policemen.^[17] Furthermore, in Shabana M Ron v. State of Kerala, the Kerala High Court was once again granted bail to some of the stone pelters owing to their distressed psychology in the testing times of the pandemic. ^[18]

Hence, it becomes essential to ascertain the presence of a psychological and criminal intent in the mind of the accused. The migrant workers did not carry any weapons with them except for stones.^[19] Although it is wrong to stone pelt police and bystanders, the protesters demanded accountability of the Government with respect to the discharge of their welfare duties; they did not intend to commit murder.^[20] Such an act fails to have a criminal intent required for deliberately propelling unruly elements in the State.^[21]

Exploring the Alternatives

Hence, instead of charging these individuals with the serious offences like Section 307, conviction under Section 270 IPC that is “malignant act likely to spread infection of disease dangerous to life” is more appropriate.^[22] Those who throw stones at police and civilians can also be successfully convicted under Section 188 which punishes on account of disobedience of orders promulgated by the public servants tending to risk human life.^[23]

Conclusion

India is a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and is obligated to adhere to the principles of the Convention.^[24] Article 10 of ICCPR mandates to treat each individual with the requisite dignity.^[25] The lockdown was an immediate measure taken up by the Government to curb the spread of COVID-19 but the inefficiencies and the consequences which followed due to lack national planning has affected the migrant workers financially and emotionally.^[26] There is no doubt that the stone pelting by the distressed migrant workers upon the police led to a breach of law and order. The question which brims is that was it appropriate to legally charge the migrant workers with the heinous offences like murder? Charging these migrants with attempted murder was not legally justified—especially when other, less extreme charges, would have been more appropriate for the circumstances.

^[1] Ramesh Luthra, Coronavirus India Lockdown Day, The Hindu (2020), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/coronavirus-india-lockdown-august-27-2020-live-updates/article32452598.ece

^[2] Madhunika Iyer, Migration in India and the Impact of the Lockdown on Migrants, The PRS India (2020), https://www.prsindia.org/theprsblog/migration-india-and-impact-lockdown-migrants

^[3] Jawgar Sircar, A Long Look at Exactly Why and How India Failed its Migrant Workers, The Wire (2020), https://thewire.in/labour/lockdown-migrant-workers-policy-analysis

^[4] Sundaram Srinisvasan, Hundreds of Migrant Workers Protest, The Times of India (2020), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/mangaluru-hundreds-of-migrant-workers-protest-at-railway-station/articleshow/75624186.cms

^[5] Adarsh Srivastava, Protest or Rebel, The Tribune (2020), https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/delhi/50-migrant-workers-booked-after-clashes-with-haryana-police-near-delhi-gurugram-border-87398

^[6] Ibid.

^[7] M.P. Nathanael, Licensed to beat, abuse and kill, The Hindu (2020), https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/licensed-to-beat-abuse-and-kill/article31609626.ece

^[8] Geeta Pandey, Desperate Migrant Workers trapped in Lockdown, The BBC (2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-52360757

^[9] Siddarth Bhatia, Why Indian Don’t Come Out on the Streets Against Regular Police Brutality, The Wire (2020), https://thewire.in/rights/george-floyd-protests-india-police-brutality

^[10] Ashmita Nandy, Why migrant workers long for home, The Quint (2020), https://www.thequint.com/videos/coronavirus-lockdown-why-are-surat-migrant-labourers-protesting-to-go-home

^[11] Saba, To attract S. 307 IPC, there must be intention or knowledge on part of accused, The SCC Online Blog (2020), https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2017/12/27/attract-s-307-ipc-must-intention-knowledge-part-accused/

^[12] Ibid.

^[13] Yogesh v State of Maharashtra (2019) 5 SCC OnLine Bom 1039.

^[14] Sarosh Bana, The Government is not interested in stopping torture by the police, The National Herald (2020), https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/the-government-is-not-interested-in-stopping-torture-by-the-police

^[15] Joe Wallen, Protests break out in India as Migrant workers stranded and starving far from home, The Telegraph (2020), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2020/04/17/protests-break-india-migrant-workers-stranded-starving-far-home/

^[16] Ibid.

^[17] Karan Nair v State of Maharashtra, (2020) 8 SCC 457, ¶ 81.

^[18] Shabana M Ron v State of Kerala, (2020) 7 SCC 859, ¶ 14.

^[19] Lockdown: Migrant Workers clash with Police in Gujarat, The Economic Times (2020), https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/migrant-workers-pelt-stones-at-police-in-surat/articleshow/75533181.cms

^[20] Nathulal v State of Maharashtra, (1966) 4 SCC 43.

^[21] State Of Gujarat v Chauhan Mulsinh Cheharsinh, (2004) 7 SCC OnLineGuj 4847

^[22] Tarunabh Khaitan, What Courts Say, What Courts Do, UK Constitutional Law Association ( 2014), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/04/24/tarunabh-khaitan-nalsa-v-union-of-india-what-courts-say-what-courts-do/

^[23] Ibid.

^[24] “General Comment No. 13: Equality before the courts and the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent court established by law”. UN OHCHR. 13 April 1984. Retrieved 10 October 2010.

^[25] International Federation for Human Rights, India: Government fails to address key human rights concerns during UN review, 21 September 2017, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/59c8e62b4.html %5Baccessed 15 September 2020]

^[26] Ibid.

Abandoning Climate Refugees: A “Crime against Humanity” under International Criminal Law?

Posted on September 15, 2020December 12, 2020 by guulr in Blog Fall 2020, GUULR Blog, Uncategorized

By: TIRTHARAJ CHOUDHURY and DEEKSHA SHARMA

On 7 January 2020, the United Nations Human Rights Committee decided that international refugees should not be sent home.[1] This decision was handed down by the committee after examining the case of Ioane Teitiota, a Kiribati citizen of South Tarawa, who was seeking refugee rights in New Zealand, but was denied. While upholding New Zealand’s decision, the Committee agreed that climate threats would in the future prevent international law states from returning refugees to their own countries. This decision is quite relevant in relation to international criminal law and the responsibility to protect Environmental Refugees.^[2] “Environmental refugee”, a term coined by Essam El-Hinnawi, identifies people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat temporarily or permanently because of a significant environmental (natural and/or human-induced) disturbance that endangers their life and/or seriously affects the quality of their lives.[3]

As international refugee law fails to take into consideration climate/ecological refugees, the article suggests that international criminal law could be resorted to in this situation. The article will clarify the application of international criminal law, in particular “Crimes Against Humanity” (CAH) for the protection of refugees due to climate change, natural disasters and environmental crimes. CAH have been a measure in international court tribunals for acts that “shocked the conscience of mankind”.^[4]

Slow-onset disasters, fueled by climate change render places uninhabitable by creeping up on communities. While their relatively slow evolution offers an opportunity to prepare appropriate responses, the perceived lack of urgency can pose a significant challenge for those affected.^[5] This takes into consideration the country’s own legislation on disaster prevention, but the legislation in some countries does not include slow-onset disasters and climate induced sudden events, such as super-cyclones for example. In these scenarios, man’s presence and his actions alter the nature and extent of a disaster.^[6] A similar thing happened when Cyclone Amphan caused massive damage and destruction in India.^[7] It is also possible to draw a connection between mass crimes and climate change, both of which endanger the most basic rights of the population.^[8] Jessica Cooper goes a step further, suggesting that both slow-onset disasters related to climate change and sudden natural disasters can be regarded as persecution.[9] In order to satisfy the criterion of persecution for a specific cause, Cooper claims that the ecologically displaced people are being persecuted on the grounds that they belong to a certain social community, namely a category of individuals who are politically helpless to defend their environment.^[10]

The second situation is the assistance by the international community in a timely manner. Previously, Russian scientists had reported that a small Arctic island had disappeared, saying that only open water remained at the site. In these recent examples, the islands were small and uninhabited, but scientists say the fate of these tiny pieces of land could be a harbinger of what is to come.^[11] Researchers also expect that before the end of this century, islands such as Maldives, Tuvalu and, Fiji will be underwater.

CAH has an expounding and evolving context, and from what we have witnessed, it has been in the process of gradual development since its inception. Potential CAH cases brought under the ICC may occur as states plan to expel individuals fleeing environmental catastrophe in home countries, posing a threat to life.^[12] Again, it is problematic that states with the resources and the potential to offer shelter for fleeing communities do not provide refuge in their countries as the universal concept of refugees does not cover climate refugees.^[13] This implements the “burden sharing” of the detrimental impact of climate change on the refugee-hosting community.^[14]

The third situation concerns man-made disasters that directly affect the environment, such as illegal wildlife trade, river dumping and unrestricted logging, the result of which is ecological refugees. Westra in her book, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees notes that the case states ICC cases for the former Yugoslavia and the Rome Legislation are illustrative of the open essence of CAH, which indicate that they would accommodate ecological crimes. She further says that CAH take into consideration the lower mens rea level of “knowledge of an attack” making ecological crimes a perfect fit for this category.^[15]

Conclusion

As environmental disasters, caused by climate change or otherwise, worsen, increasing populations suffer from the negative effects of climate change by death or displacement. With this comes the so-called Responsibility to Protect of home states and the international community, failure to comply with which should count as a CAH and such incidents should be brought under the jurisdiction of ICC. We need to look towards international criminal law and its amalgamation with International Environmental Law for solutions, the demand for which keeps rising daily. Though steps are slowly being taken to reduce emissions to cut down on our carbon footprint, it is still not enough. It is high time for international law to pay heed to this rapidly deteriorating situation at hand.

[1] Refworld. 2020. Refworld | Ioane Teitiota V. New Zealand (Advance Unedited Version), https://www.refworld.org/cases,HRC,5e26f7134.html.

^[2] Melinna Godin, Climate Refugees Cannot Be Sent Home, U.N. Rules | Time (2020), https://time.com/5768347/climate-refugees-un-ioane-teitiota/.

[3] Globalization101, http://www.globalization101.org/environmental-refugees/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CEnvironmental%20refugee%E2%80%9D%2C%20a%20term,seriously%20effects%20the%20quality%20of.

^[4] Charles Jalloh, What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity? (28 ed. 2013), American University International Law Review.

^[5] Elisa Alonzo, Slow onset disasters: where climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction meet | PreventionWeb.net (2017), https://www.preventionweb.net/news/view/53004.

^[6] IDRL Guidelines at the 31st International Conference,, https://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-law/about-disaster-law/international-disaster-response-laws-rules-and-principles/idrl-guidelines/.

^[7] Architesh Panda, Climate Change, Displacement, and Managed Retreat in Coastal India (2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/climate-change-displacement-managed-retreat-india.

^[8] Naser, Mostafa. (2013). Climate Change induced Displacement: Definitional Issues and Concerns. Chicago-Kent Journal of Environmental and Energy Law. 2.

[9] Jessica Cooper, Note, Environmental Refugees: Meeting the Requirements of the Refugee Definition, 6 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 480, 503 (1998), at 509.

^[10] Shouvik Guha, According Refugee Protection to Environmental Migrants: An overview under International Refugee Law (2 ed.), International Journal of International Law.

^[11] Denise Chow, Three islands disappeared in the past year. Is climate change to blame? (2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/science/three-islands-disappeared-past-year-climate-change-blame-ncna1015316.

^[12] Charles Chernor Jalloh, What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime Against Humanity? , 28 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev. 381 (2013), https://ecollections.law.fiu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1246&context=faculty_publications#:~:text=30%2C%202012)%20(defining%20crimes,religious%20or%20political%20grounds%22).

^[13] Peter Lehner, Environment, Law, and Nonprofits: How NGOs Shape Our Laws, Health, and Communities, 26 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 19 (2009), https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol26/iss1/2/

^[14] Nafess Ahmad, Overheating the Humanitarian Law in contemporary international relations (2018), https://www.ifimes.org/en/9551.

^[15] Laura Westra, Environmental Justice and the Rights of Ecological Refugees 188 (2009).

NALSA Judgment: Critique of the Indian Perspective Beyond the Adams-and-Eves Worldview

Posted on August 25, 2020December 12, 2020 by guulr in Blog Fall 2020, GUULR Blog, Uncategorized

By: AASTHA KHANNA and DIVESH SAWHNEY

Aastha Khanna, LL.B. student, Law Centre-1, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi; aasthakhanna0204@gmail.com

Divesh Sawhney, LL.B. student, Law Centre-1, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi; divesh.sawhney2@gmail.com

Fifty Eight… Beyond the man-woman binary, there are as many 58 gender variants.^[1]^. Transgender persons’ lives are no longer footnotes in the law books, their identities are no longer uniformly bound to surgical requirements. The Judicial ken on the subject has come out of the valley of shadows to bask in the glistening sunlight of liberty — from Corbett’s^[2] heretic ‘biological test’/’gender dysphoria’ era to the unstinted ‘psychological aspect’/ equality principle gaining ground in recent dicta of U.S Supreme Court,^[3] African Court^[4] and Malaysian Court^[5], among others.

From India’s perspective, NALSA judgment^[6] is a monumental step in the right direction. It has unclipped the wings of an egalitarian society; and the apostles of gender-binary heresy are not so much beaten as overawed. The Court drew an analogy between trans-community and untouchables — both wracked and ostracized by the society. The wails of untouchables in India have been somewhat atoned, and the time is ripe to follow the same course for the rights of trans-community.

TERMINOLOGY & SEMANTICS

A court of law is a house of semantics. It settles the deep meaning of terminology employed in legislations, rules and what not. The NALSA Court also endeavored to expound the widely used terms attributed to the trans-community — though the Court’s propriety is another aspect. Even the sky-high intellects conflate these terminologies, but a Court can never afford to be enmeshed. For it is upon the Court to decide and accord rights based on the categorization it employs.

Women- gender; Female- Sex^[7]

To phrase it mildly, the Court committed an error in tangling the most basic conceptual difference between the foregoing terms. It employed the terms interchangeably rendering the judgment less scrutable. Eschewing from further dwelling on this, let’s consider the Court assumed male, female to be genders not sex.

The Apex court, to some extent, drew an understanding of trans terminology, especially the terms ‘sexual orientation’ and ‘gender identity’ inter alia.

The judgment neglected the grammatical aspect of the word ‘transgender’ by employing it at various places as noun instead of adjective. This term is analogous to the adjectival ‘female’ and ‘male’, therefore, its usage as a noun is derogatory to the people belonging to trans-community and reduces them to a mere object.^[8]

Further, the Court defined ‘transgender’ as an umbrella term for persons whose gender identity lies outside the pigeonhole compartments of sexual binary. The Court eloquently categorized the Indian trans-community under the set of Hijras^[9]. It also entailed male-to-female transgender persons. But then the question poses — what about female-to-male transgender persons (trans-men)? More so, a bare perusal of the directions issued in the judgment further obscure the point. ‘Hijras, Eunuchs, apart from binary gender, be treated as “third gender” for purpose of safeguarding their rights under part III of our Constitution…’^[10] Now, this circumscribes rights to Hijras and Eunuchs, while already categorizing the whole community under the rubric of Hjras.

Interestingly, whilst the categories of ‘male’ and ‘female’ are viewed through the lens of sex, it is only the ‘transgender’ category that is viewed through the lens of gender. As a corollary, transgender should be recognized as the first gender as opposed to third gender.^[11] Indeed, something to ponder over.

CONSTITUTIONAL RECOGNITION TO TRANSGENDER PERSONS

‘It is the business of the state… to maintain the conditions without which free exercise of the human faculties is impossible.’^[12]

And what possibly can surpass the liberty to express your ‘individualism.’ Ergo, Justice K.S.P Radhakrishnan. grandiloquently reflected the interplay between Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(a), and 21 of the Constitution. The ensuing paragraphs delineate this interplay.

ARTICLE 14^[13]: The major argument of the Court revolved around the fact that Article 14 employs the word ‘person’, which, as per the purposive interpretation given by the Court in the instant case, includes not only the Victorian era genders, viz., men and women but also genders outside binary. The Court, therefore, declared that transgender persons enjoy as much equal protection of law and equality before law as other genders.
ARTICLES 15^[14] & 16^[15]: The Court interpreted the word ‘sex’ under Article 15 and 16 so as to entail prohibition on gender bias and gender-based discrimination. It went a step ahead and emphasized that Constitution makers intended to prevent direct or indirect discrimination among people for not being in conformity with stereotypical generalizations of gender binary. It further recognized that transgender persons are legally entitled safe access to public places under Article 15(2); and benefits of reservation in educational institutions and public appointments as socially and educationally backward classes under Article 15(4), and for that matter under Article 16(4) as backward classes.^[16]

Given the foregoing explication by the Court, can it be inferred that a trans-woman will be entitled to the same special provisions under Articles 15 and 16 as a cisgender woman? The answer to this question is nowhere to be found in the judgment.

Apart from this, the Court, though in tune with the ‘separation of powers’, passes the buck to the legislature for delineating a reservation policy for this ostracized community. Now, transgender persons may be layered under different caste identities, what if there is a prepossession in favor of a cisgender woman over a transgender woman, when both fall under the same caste reservation bracket? The Court could have glossed on this issue by dealing with horizontal reservations cutting across the vertical categories of caste, but it eschewed from doing so.^[17] This, invariably, would lead to further litigation as instantiated in Grace Banu Ganesan v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors.^[18]

ARTICLE 19^[19]: ‘Outside gender binary, there are only pathology and disability’^[20], this endemic perception has always been repugnant to the moral precepts; and the NALSA judgment discredited all these fallacious norms by extending constitutional rights and protection to transgender persons. The Court unequivocally held that no restriction, save and except those mentioned in Article 19(2), can be placed on one’s personal expression, mannerism and clothing. It relied heavily on two foreign judgments, viz., City of Chicago v. Wilson et al.^[21] and Doe v. Yunits et al.^[22] which talk about the values of privacy, self-identity and gender expression through cross dressing.^[23]
ARTICLE 21^[24]: Wealth and opulence may be possessions of few, but liberty must be bestowed upon everybody. With this object in mind, the makers of the Constitution drafted Article 21- the heart and soul of Indian Constitution. It entitles every person — which is again a gender-neutral word and thus equally applies to man, woman and transgender persons — not only the right of mere existence but to live with dignity. Concomitantly, self-perceived gender identity and expression — a linchpin of dignified life — falls within the ambit of right to life under Article 21.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while displaying panoply of transformative constitutionalism, in NALSA judgment emphasized the need to read the Constitution as a ‘living document’^[25] in light of the present socio-political scenario. The judgment impresses upon the fact that legal recognition of gender identity is a part of right to dignity and freedom; and self-determination of gender is an integral part of personal autonomy, self-expression and personal liberty guaranteed under Article 21. Hence, any restriction on any person’s liberty to decide zir^[26] lived gender,^[27] gender identity or expression^[28] infracts Article 21.

Fundamental Rights not only protect individuals and minorities from the whims and vagaries of State action, rather they have also been shaped to protect individuals against transgressions by private citizens. For instance, Article 15(2) foils restriction or disablement of any citizen from accessing to public places on account of zir^[29] religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth; Article 17^[30] abolishes untouchability; Article 23^[31] proscribes forced labor. Thus the State, in addition to conforming to the Constitution’s injunctions not to fetter citizen’s liberties, must also fulfil its duty to protect citizen’s rights from being encroached by the society. This principle is of cardinal importance in case of transgender persons who are constantly subjected to society’s virulent deportment.

Are fundamental Rights the only safeguard etched in the Constitution? The pat answer is no. If the Fundamental Rights are an edifice, the Directive Principles of State Policies (‘DPSPs’) are the scaffolding that lays a sturdy foundation. One delineates the negative obligations, whereas the other pens down the positive duties of the State. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in NALSA judgment also referred to DPSPs — especially Article 51 dealing with international law — while directing the States to fulfil their obligations. Though DPSPs are not justiciable, they are of equal, if not more, pertinence.^[32] Hence the NALSA judgment manifests the Court’s overarching and expansive intendment to tip the scales in favor of equity — which perforce is of first importance.

This sweeping interpretation of rights can also be witnessed in the rather recent judgment of K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India^[33] wherein the rotten law of ADM Jabalpur^[34]was purged. In an eloquent passage, Lord Mansfield opined ‘I care not for the supposed dicta of judges, however eminent, if they be contrary to all principle.’

DIRECTIONS

The directions given by the Court obscure more than they illuminate. As mentioned previously, the independent reading of first and second direction renders them diametrically opposite. While the first direction recognizes hijras as third gender, the second direction gives transgender persons the right to choose between being ‘female, male or third gender.’ The question is whether hijras also have the right to choose from the binary.^[35]

Other directives like separate toilet facilities, HIV sero-surveillance centers, recognition as socially and educationally backward,[36] medical care facilities, inclusion of transgender persons in society by spreading awareness, and framing of various welfare schemes are impressive and applaud-worthy. However, implementation of such embracing directions will be a herculean task. The orders are so broad and vague, that it would be difficult to hold anyone accountable for their non-compliance.

Despite the fervent criticism displayed in this article, the judgment has decidedly provided some perspective for discourse over transgender rights in India. And, it is not an end, but only a springboard to travail further.

THE EVOLVING INDIAN PERSPECTIVE

The melancholic tale of Khairati,^[37] the tragic victim of rigid gender binary, speaks volumes of the absence of empathy in the colonial courts to comprehend what Khairati experienced. Unfortunately, this absence continued into independent India. The language and dimensions of Constitution never applied to the lives of transgender persons.

Only when the NALSA Court cracked open this legal mold and refused to categorize humans into an orthodox quagmire of societal identities, formulating an eclectic theory of transgender rights, that the Courts and wider public (‘NALSA Judgment & Beyond’- survey^[38]) began to see transgender community through the lens of dignity. Now that gender identity- the gatekeeper to other rights – has been recognized, the other set of monolithic heresies on same-sex marriage, consensual cohabitation, among other things,^[39] must be scotched. No democracy can blossom when contraries are labeled heretics. Now, the onus is upon us to help this downtrodden community to vault from the cavernous depths of marginalization, and soar in the sky of tranquility and contentment, which can only be achieved through social reforms.^[40]

This Internationally hailed case and the resultant legislation^[41] are beginning of an end, of the dilemma of a transgender person’s life, beautifully expressed by the illustrious author Arundhati Roy in the following words:

“She, who never knew which box to tick, which queue to stand in, which public toilet to enter (Kings or Queens? Lords or Ladies? Sirs or Hers?)

She, who knew she was all wrong, always wrong.

She, augmented by her ambiguity.”^[42]

^[1] Arun Kumar and Anr v. Inspector General of Registration and Ors, (2019) SCC OnLine Mad 8779, ¶17; Following the policy of inclusivity, social media platforms like Facebook and Tinder now allow users to choose from 58 and 37 gender identities respectively while signing up.

^[2] National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India, (2014) 5 SCC 438, ¶81.

^[3] Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, 590 U.S. ____ (2020)

^[4] Motshidiemang v. Attorney General, MAHGB-000591-16; see also, EG v. Attorney General, Petition Nos. 150 and 234 of 2016.

^[5] Muhamad Juzaili Bin Mohd Khamis v. State Government of Negeri Sembilan, N-01-498-11/2012.

^[6] National legal Services Authority v. Union of India (hereinafter, ‘NALSA’), (2014) 5 SCC 438

^[7] GLAAD Media Reference Guide- Transgender, https://www.glaad.org/reference/transgender (Last visited on June 25, 2020); see also, Gender Definitions, World health Organisation, Regional Office for Europe, available at https://www.euro.who.int/en/health-topics/health-determinants/gender/gender-definitions (Last visited on June 25, 2020); Mikkola, Mari, “Feminist Perspectives on Sex and Gender”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), available at, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2019/entries/feminism-gender. (Last visited on June 25, 2020); Office of National Statistics (UK), What is the difference between sex and gender?, available at https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/environmentalaccounts/articles/whatisthedifferencebetweensexandgender/2019-02-21 (Last visited on July 3, 2020),

^[8] HUMAN LAW RIGHTS NETWORK, People’s Inquiry into the status of the implementation of the NALSA judgment (November 2016), available at http://reproductiverights.hrln.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/nalsa-ipt-report.pdf (Last visited on June 25, 2020); see also, VIDHI CENTRE FOR LEGAL POLICY, Comments on the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Bill, 2016, available at, https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/SubmissionsontheTransgenderBill2016.pdf (Last visited on June 25, 2020)

^[9] NALSA, at ¶47

^[10] NALSA, at ¶135.1

^[11] VIDHI CENTRE FOR LEGAL POLICY, Queering the Law: Making Indian Laws LGBT+ Inclusive (July 2019), available at https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/Queering-the-Law_Introduction.pdf. (Last visited on June 25, 2020)

^[12] THOMAS HILL GREEN, LIBERAL LEGILATION AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 9-15 (1861)

^[13] Article 14: Equality before law.

^[14] Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth.

^[15] Article 16: Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment

^[16] NALSA, at ¶¶63-68

^[17] Tarunabh Khaitan, NALSA v. Union of India: What Courts Say, What Courts Do, UK Constitutional Law Association (April 24, 2014), available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/04/24/tarunabh-khaitan-nalsa-v-union-of-india-what-courts-say-what-courts-do/ (Last visited on June 25, 2020)

^[18] W.P. 6052/2019 (CNR Number: HCMA01-031907-2019)

^[19] Article 19: Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of speech, etc.

^[20] PAUL B. PRECIADO, COUNTER-SEXUAL MANIFESTO 5 (2018)

^[21] 75 III.2d 525(1978)

^[22] 2000 WL33162199 (Mass. Super.)

^[23] NALSA, at ¶¶ 70.1, 70.2.

^[24] Article 21: Protection of Life and Personal Liberty

^[25] The doctrine of ‘Living Tree’, a Canadian law doctrine describes Constitution as a living document, which keeps evolving with the changing times. The meaning of the Constitution may not be frozen to the perspective when it was adopted.

^[26] Gender neutral pronoun used for a person existing outside the binary.

^[27] “lived gender” refers to each person’s gender identity and its public expression over a sustained period of time, See Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act, 2015 (Republic of Malta) Cl. 2.

^[28] “gender expression” refers to each person’s manifestation of their gender identity, and, or the one that is perceived by others, see Gender Identity, Gender Expression and Sex Characteristics Act, 2015 (Republic of Malta) Cl. 2.

^[29] Supra note 25

^[30] Article 17: Abolition of Untouchability

^[31] Article 23: Prohibition of traffic in human beings and forced labour.

^[32] NALSA, at ¶ 102 (per Dr. A.K. Sikri J.)

^[33] Justice (Retd.) K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1

^[34] (1976) 2 SCC 521

^[35] Tarunabh Khaitan, NALSA v. Union of India: What Courts Say, What Courts Do, UK Constitutional Law Association (April 24, 2014), available at https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/04/24/tarunabh-khaitan-nalsa-v-union-of-india-what-courts-say-what-courts-do/

[36] John W. Armour, Compenatory Discrimination: The Indian Constitution and Judicial Review, (16) MELBOURNE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 126, 135-136 (1987); See also, The Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 342A.

^[37] Queen Empress v. Khairati I.L.R. 6 All 205. This was the first reported case of the use of Section 377 against a person described by the Court as a ‘eunuch’. This case goes back to 1884 when a person named Khairati was arrested and tried under section 377 on the grounds of habitually wearing women’s clothes and committing sodomy. Although Khairati was ultimately acquitted by the Court due to the lack of evidence, the key point in the case was the violence and brutality she was subjected to during the legal proceedings.

^[38] A survey, ‘NALSA Judgment & Beyond’, was conducted in June 2020 to study the public attitude towards transgender persons post NALSA judgment. The graphical representation of the inference drawn is available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/12TP-uAxMcv6uGVjwbtetnBGCqMVNXkBe/view?usp=sharing

^[39] Uttarakhand High Court in Madhu Bala v. State of Uttarakhand [Habeas Corpus Petition No. 8 of 2020] interpreted the consensual cohabitation between two adults of same sex within the ambit of Article 21(Right to life and Personal Liberty); see also, a Writ Petition filed in Kerala High Court in Jan 2020 wherein the petitioner has prayed for recognition of same-sex marriage under Special Marriage Act, 1954 available at https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/pdf_upload-369544.pdf (Last visited on June 25, 2020); Madras High Court in Arun Kumar and Anr v. Inspector General of Registration and Ors, (2019) SCC OnLine Mad 8779 held that a transwoman is a ‘bride’ under Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

^[40] The Noida Metro Rail Corporation (NMRC) has recently decided to dedicate Noida’s Sector 50 Metro Station to transgender community by renaming it to ‘Rainbow Station’; Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) recently sought views of paramilitary forces on recruiting transgender people in central paramilitary forces and Indian Army.

^[41] Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, 40 of 2019

^[42] ARUNDHATI ROY, THE MINISTRY OF UTMOST HAPPINESS 122 Penguin Books 2018.

Analyzing the Indo-China Border Dispute: An International Law Perspective Through the Prism of India

Posted on August 3, 2020December 12, 2020 by guulr in Blog Fall 2020, GUULR Blog, Uncategorized

By: ISHAN KUMAR and NAMAN KATYAL

Ishan Kumar is a third year undergraduate student pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in legislative laws. He attends Gujarat National Law University(GNLU) in Gandhinagar, India.

Naman Katyal is a third year undergraduate student pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in legislative laws. He attends Gujarat National Law University(GNLU) in Gandhinagar, India.

Introduction

Two of the world’s nuclear powers, India and China are locked in a border dispute in the Pangong Tso and Galwan Valley areas of Eastern Ladakh along the Line of Actual Control (“LAC”).^[1] The LAC is a demarcation line along the Indo-China border based on the differing perception of the border by both sides and functions as the de-facto border between the two nations since both sides have consistently failed to establish a demarcated border due to China’s refusal to recognize the validity of the Simla Accord of 1914 and the Panchsheel Treaty of 1954 in the eyes of international law.^[2]

The dispute turned violent for the first time in 45 years at the largely peaceful border on June 15, 2020, when the Indian side suffered a casualty count of 20 soldiers in a melee with Chinese troops.^[3] Reports also indicate that the Chinese side lost 43 soldiers.^[4] The Chinese have refused to reveal the exact count.^[5]

This article analyzes the Indo-China border dispute by evaluating the validity of the aforementioned treaties in international law through an Indian perspective. The authors postulate that a third-party dispute settlement can be a suitable mechanism through which the dispute could be resolved.

Tracing the Roots

The Indo-China border dispute dates back to the nineteenth century with the first treaty signed between the independent forces of the two nations coming into effect only in 1842.^[6] Since then, several attempts have been made to demarcate the boundary between the two nations.

The Simla Accord of 1914 established the McMahon Line as the boundary between the two nations.[7] The Panchsheel Treaty signed in 1954 was another historic agreement between the two sides.[8] However, both the agreements failed to resolve the border dispute and as a consequence the Indo-China war occurred in 1962. During this time, the People’s Liberation Army of China annexed parts of India’s Ladakh region.^[9]

Sustained attempts to achieve peace and tranquility at the border resulted in several other agreements in 1993, 1996, 2003, 2005, 2012, and 2013.^[10] Nonetheless, the tension at the LAC remains unresolved.

Legitimacy of the Simla Accord the Eyes of International Law

The Simla Accord of 1914 was a treaty negotiated amongst the representatives of British India, the Republic of China, and Tibet to define the boundary between Tibet and British India, as well as Tibet and China.^[11] Although China participated in the negotiation of the treaty, it declined to sign the convention and the British and Tibetan plenipotentiaries signed it as a bilateral declaration and denied China any privileges.^[12] The boundary between Tibet and British India came to be known as the McMahon Line.^[13]

China’s refusal to recognize the Simla Accord as a legally binding treaty primarily stems from this very reason. The fact that no Chinese Central Government ever ratified the treaty also features as one of the objections by China in recognizing the Simla Accord as legally binding.^[14] Furthermore, China has also lamented that the Accord was “a product of British policy of aggression against the Tibet Region of China”,^[15] and therefore an unequal treaty.^[16]

China’s contention that the Chinese plenipotentiary refused to sign the declaration, and, in any case, no Chinese Central Government ever ratified the treaty fails on two grounds. Firstly, the collapse of talks was on the issue of settlement of the border between Tibet and China, not Tibet and British India.^[17] Subsequently, a bilateral agreement between Tibet and British India duly defined the boundary between both signatories.^[18] China’s assent was not required to demarcate the boundary between Tibet and British India, as Tibet had control over its foreign affairs in 1914.^[19] Secondly, the treaty, per Article 11 of the Accord, was to take effect from the date of signature and no explicit provision of the treaty stipulated ratification.^[20]

Even if the Chinese contentions are accepted, even then the subsequent action of incorporating the updated map in official records and successive conduct of not raising the dispute for 45 years (until 1959) after the signing of the treaty belie the Chinese claim.^[21] The doctrine of acquiescence requires the acquiescent party to raise any objection to the infringement of its rights and failure to do so can be held against it if the objection is raised after long-term acquiescence.^[22] In the Pedra Branca islands dispute case, Singapore’s central argument that for 130 years–that Singapore’s exercise of sovereignty over the islands was not challenged by Malaysia–was accepted by the ICJ and the Sovereignty over the islands recognized to belong to Singapore.^[23]

Further, China’s argument that Simla Accord was an unequal treaty given the aggressive policy adopted by the British against China also fails to advance the Chinese contention that Simla Accord cannot be recognized as legally binding. Even if a treaty includes provisions that appear unequal, a party cannot invoke the principle of inequality to invalidate the treaty if there is no coercion or use of force.^[24] The Simla Accord came into force after exhaustive negotiations which spanned over a period of six-months and were based on an explicit authorization from the Chinese government.^[25] This demonstrates that the Chinese government was under no duress from the British and acted without any inhibitions.

Panchsheel Treaty As a Political Document?

The Panchsheel Treaty is a set of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence enshrined in the preamble to the “Agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India” which was signed in 1954.^[26] The first principle of the treaty envisaged mutual respect for one another’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The treaty was signed after meticulous negotiations with almost all aspects of the Indo-China relations being discussed but no border dispute was raised.^[27]

All this put the then Prime Minister of India under the impression that there were no border disputes between the two countries.^[28] Meanwhile, China continued to term the treaty as a political document for bargaining bilaterally and not a treaty that would be subjected to interpretations by international courts.^[29] The Chinese government’s stand of subverting the treaty does not stand ground in International Law as oral declarations made by government functionaries have been held to be valid and binding. For instance, in the Eastern Greenland case, an oral statement given by Norway’s Foreign Minister was considered by the Permanent Court of International Justice to be binding on Norway.^[30]

Moving Towards a Resolution

The Indo-China border dispute has now turned at least 65 years old with no significant breakthrough in defining the border.^[31] Even the most rudimentary task of exchanging maps to understand the differing perception of the two nations with respect to the LAC has not been concluded.^[32] The prospects of a resolution secured through bilateral arrangements look improbable. Other mechanisms to resolve the dispute need to be considered.

One such recourse could be to make use of a third-party dispute settlement mechanism. The third-party dispute settlement mechanism allows a party that is external to the dispute to help the disputants reach a settlement.^[33] A combined reading of Article 33(1) and 33(2) of the UN Charter authorizes the UN Security Council to call upon the parties to a dispute to resolve their differences through means stated in Article 33(1) (which includes third-party means).^[34]

In the past, third-party interventions in dispute settlement have yielded positive results. The Rio Protocol of 1942 was signed by the governments of Peru and Ecuador (the disputants) with Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and the United States, wherein the latter four nations would act as guarantors for the former two.^[35] This agreement led to the successful demarcation of 95% of the disputed border by 1946.^[36] Similar instances include the role of the Pope and Algeria in successfully adjudicating the Argentina-Chile Beagle Channel Dispute and the Iran hostage’s crisis, respectively.^[37] ^[38]

Russia could be asked to mediate between India and China by virtue of it sharing cordial relations with both the countries.^[39] India and Russia have enjoyed a longstanding “special and privileged strategic partnership.”^[40] On similar lines, Russia and China have a plethora of common interests, which prominently includes ending the dynamics of the US-dominated unipolar world.^[41] Also, Russia has prior experience of attempting to settle the Indo-China border differences, which could be crucial in restoring peace between India and China.^[42]

Conclusion

The uncertainty surrounding the border dispute has adversely affected the bilateral relations between India and China. The Indo-China border faceoff has spiraled into a precarious trade war which could have repercussions on the economies of both nations.^[43]The situation calls for a thorough revamping of diplomatic channels to overcome differences and ensure the anti-status quo.

Therefore, the two Asian giants must strive to amicably resolve their territorial dispute to avoid hampering their decades-long ties and international repute. The emerging world order after the advent of COVID-19 outbreak may help China and India to settle the boundary stand-off.

Undeniably, the benefits that accrue of settled land borders between the two Asian powerhouses are obvious and of utmost importance. If ever there is a historic opportunity for the two Asian giants to resolve the contested boundary, it is now.

^[1] Bagchi I, “Jaishankar to Meet China FM in Virtual RIC Meet on June 22” The Times of India (June 15, 2020) <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jaishankar-to-meet-china-fm-in-virtual-ric-meet-on-june-22/articleshow/76377098.cms> accessed June 15, 2020

^[2] Krishnan A, “ Line of Actual Control | India-China: the Line of Actual Contest ”The Hindu (June 13, 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/line-of-actual-control-india-china-the-line-of-actual-contest/article31822311.ece> accessed June 15, 2020; Prabhakar Singh, “Sino–Indian Attitudes to International Law: of Nations, States and Colonial Hangovers” 3(2) Chinese Journal of Comparative Law

^[3] Krishnan A, “Forgotten in Fog of War, the Last Firing on the India-China Border ”The Hindu (June 14, 2020) <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/forgotten-in-fog-of-war-the-last-firing-on-the-india-china-border/article31827344.ece> accessed June 16, 2020.; Safi M and Davidson H, “ Soldiers Fell to Their Deaths as India and China’s Troops Fought with Rocks” The Guardian (June 17, 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/17/shock-and-anger-in-india-after-worst-attack-on-china-border-in-decades> accessed June 17, 2020

^[4] “Galwan Valley: India and China Downplay Reports of Soldier Release” BBC News (June 19, 2020) <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53102629> accessed June 16, 2020

^[5] “China Suffered 43 Casualties in Violent Face-off in Galwan Valley, Reveal Indian Intercepts” Hindustan Times (June 17, 2020) <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-suffered-43-casualties-in-violent-face-off-in-galwan-valley-reveal-indian-intercepts/story-7JhOt8tC6cfC9bx3CUzrTI.html> accessed June 17, 2020

^[6] “Ladakhi Letter of Agreement (1842)” (Tibet Justice Center) <https://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/treaties/treaties3.html> accessed June 18, 2020

[7] Gupta K, “The McMahon Line 1911–45: The British Legacy” (1971) 47 The China Quarterly 521

[8] ‘The Five Principles’ (Ministry of foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 14 June 2014) < https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/seminaronfiveprinciples_665898/t140589.shtml > accessed 27 June 2020

^[9] “India-China War of 1962: How It Started and What Happened Later” India Today (November 21, 2016) <https://www.indiatoday.in/education-today/gk-current-affairs/story/india-china-war-of-1962-839077-2016-11-21> accessed June 19, 2020

^[10] Gill P, “India Says There Are Five Treaties to Push the Chinese Army behind the Line of Actual Control⁠ — While Experts Tell Modi to Remain Cautious” Business Insider (May 29, 2020) <https://www.businessinsider.in/defense/news/five-treaties-to-address-india-china-border-issue-experts-warn-modi-to-remain-cautious/articleshow/76085340.cms> accessed June 19, 2020

^[11] “Convention Between Great Britain, China, and Tibet, Simla (1914)” (Tibet Justice Center) <http://www.tibetjustice.org/materials/treaties/treaties16.html> accessed June 20, 2020

^[12] Mehra P, “A Forgotten Chapter in the History of the Northeast Frontier: 1914–36” (1972) 31 The Journal of Asian Studies 299

^[13] Ibid.

^[14] Surya P Sharma, ‘The India-China Border Dispute: An Indian Perspective’ (1965) 59 Am J Int’l L 16

^[15] Ibid.

^[16] “100 Years after Simla Accord, Its Historical Impact Is Still Debated” (Canada Tibet Committee April 28, 2014) <https://tibet.ca/en/library/wtn/12902> accessed June 22, 2020

^[17] (n 11).

^[18] Ibid.

^[19] (n 14).

^[20] (n 11).

^[21] Green LC, “Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border Dispute” (1960) 3 The China Quarterly 42

^[22] I C MacGibbon, “The Scope of Acquiescence in International Law” (1954) 31 Brit YB Int’l L 143

^[23] (2003) ICJ 146.

^[24] Jiangfeng Li, “Equal or Unequal: Seeking a New Paradigm for the Misused Theory of Unequal Treaties in Contemporary International Law” (2016) 38 Hous J Int’l L 465

^[25] (n 14).

^[26] (n 8).

^[27] Stahnke AA, “The Place of International Law in Chinese Strategy and Tactics: The Case of the Sino-Indian Boundary Dispute” (1970) 30 The Journal of Asian Studies 95, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2942725?seq=1.

^[28] Ibid.

^[29] Prabhakar Singh, “Sino–Indian Attitudes to International Law: of Nations, States and Colonial Hangovers” 3(2) Chinese Journal of Comparative Law

^[30] 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53.

^[31] Singh VK, “Resolving the Boundary Dispute” (India Seminar2006) < http://www.india-seminar.com/2006/562/562-vk-singh.htm> accessed July 1, 2020

^[32] Krishnan A, “It Took China Just Three Weeks since PM Modi’s Visit to Snub His Efforts to Clarify the LAC. The Neighbours Now Face Yet Another Stalemate in Resolving the Boundary Issue.” India Today (June 11, 2015) <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20150622-china-india-lac-modi-visit-xi-jinping-border-dispute-819865-2015-06-11> accessed July 1, 2020

^[33] Bilder RB, “International Third Party Dispute Settlement” (2020) 17 Denver Journal of International Law & Policy

^[34] UN Charter, art 33(1).

^[35] Simmons BA, “Territorial Disputes and Their Resolution The Case of Ecuador and Peru” [1999] United States Institute of Peace

^[36] Ibid.

^[37] “Chile, Argentina Sign Protocol on Beagle ”The Washingtom Post (October 19, 1984) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1984/10/19/chile-argentina-sign-protocol-on-beagle/f8e5a9db-f01c-4a5a-9691-f91861c095eb/> accessed July 2, 2020

^[38] Howe M, “Wary Algeria Edged Into Pivotal Role” The New York Times (January 26, 1981) <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/01/26/world/wary-algeria-edged-into-pivotal-role.html> accessed July 2, 2020

^[39] “Russia as India-China Mediator: How Soviets, Mao’s China Split over India in 1950s-60s” The Week (June 23, 2020) <https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2020/06/23/russia-as-india-china-mediator-how-soviet-mao-china-split-over-india-in-1950s-60.html> accessed July 3, 2020

^[40] Center M, “Joint Statement: Celebrating a Decade of the India- Russian Federation Strategic Partnership and Looking Ahead” (Ministry of External Affairs December 21, 2010) < https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/5118/Joint+Statement+Celebrating+a+Decade+of+the+India+Russian+Federation+Strategic+Partnership+and+Looking+Ahead> accessed July 2, 2020

^[41] Wong K-H, “How Will the Coronavirus Outbreak Affect Russia-China Relations? ”The Diplomat (March 14, 2020) <https://thediplomat.com/2020/03/how-will-the-coronavirus-outbreak-affect-russia-china-relations/> accessed July 3, 2020

^[42] (n 39).

^[43] Misra U, “Explained: Why China Trade Ban Will Hurt India More” The Indian Express (June 22, 2020) < https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-trade-ban-explained-6465949/> accessed July 2, 2020

Reading Gaslighting Induced Sexual Acts as Rape – Capacity to Consent

Posted on July 17, 2020December 12, 2020 by guulr in Blog Fall 2020, GUULR Blog, Uncategorized

By: VEDANTHA SAI

Vedantha Sai is a fifth year undergraduate student reading Law at The National University of Advanced Legal Studies (NUALS), Kochi, India. He possesses a keen interest in Public International Law, Human Rights, International Criminal Law and Constitutional Law.

Introduction

‘Gaslighting’ is defined as, “the action of manipulating someone by psychological means into accepting a false depiction of reality or doubting their own sanity.”^[1] In gaslighting, the complexity of consent is magnified. It is necessary to ascertain whether the nature of the relationship between the survivor and the abuser vis-a-vis the survivor’ state of mind vitiates the otherwise prima-facie consent and result in rape? For instance, if one verbally consents under false pretenses in a gaslighting situation, is this true consent? The trouble arises when gaslighting is employed as a psychological maneuver to make (potential) sexual partners partake in sexual acts which they would not have consented to absent the gaslighting.

Gaslighting undermines individual autonomy, which inherently prevents the individual from giving consent. Any consent supposedly given is void ab initio. In relationships, wherein gaslighting leads to sexual acts or intercourse, such acts are non-consensual and amount to sexual assault or rape. Survivors of such gaslighting, therefore, should be entitled to full legal protections and remedies.

The dangerous consequence is that, at the time of engaging in these sexual acts, the survivors themselves, because they have been deceived by the perpetrator, believe that his/her consent is free and legitimate. However, it is only later that they realize that they have been gaslit and have suffered an attack on their autonomy and mistakenly ‘consented’ to certain sexual acts. Are those sexual acts, engaged in whilst being gaslit, consensual or coerced?

The otherwise de-facto consensual sexual act could be converted into a crime of sexual assault, upon the consent being deemed as coerced; hence, vitiated. This psychological maneuver of gaslighting, as employed by the victimizer, blurs the line of consent that resides in the grey area between consensual sexual intercourse and sexual assault.

Cause for Concern – Stakeholder Analysis

Gaslighting-induced sexual relations is highly worrisome for numerous reasons. First, perpetrators believe this to be a ‘workaround’ to evade any allegations of sexual assault by applying gaslighting techniques which would make sexual acts prima-facie appear as consensual. Second, Courts are also likely to be of the view that it was consensual and consent cannot be withdrawn retrospectively. Third, society at large would not view these acts as amounting to rape or sexual assault, as the traditional requirements for sexual assault as laid down by rape culture narrative, such as resistance and saying ‘no’ by the victim, and use of force by the perpetrator, are absent. Lastly and crucially, the key stakeholder in this disputation, the victim, who is placed at a similar level of torment and anguish as any other rape victim, is left remedy-less, despite having far worse mental trauma as in this case it was inflicted by someone who was in a position of trust, such as a romantic or sexual partner and further they would self-blame and self-loathe for having given ‘consent.’

Gaslighting an Attack on Autonomy – Vitiates Consent

The distinctive feature of gaslighting is that it always undermines a survivor’s self-trust in his/her epistemic capacities, such as perception, memory, and knowledge and constitutes an assault on the victim’s reality and undermines his/her autonomy. Gaslighting’s apparatus for effectuating the same, are diverse and plentiful and aimed at removing and/or obscuring the survivor’s opportunities for learning about his/her true reality.^[2] Thus, any alleged consent that is received at this point of time wherein, the survivor was doubting his/her sanity and did not have a clear comprehension of reality, could certainly not be conceived as one which was unequivocal and voluntary. Therefore, it is argued that any consent provided by the survivor for gaslighting induced sexual acts, cannot be true-free consent and therefore, these acts are non-consensual and would amount to rape.

The question of post-factum revoking of consent does not arise; as per the theory of vices du consentement, defective consent is vitiated in initio.^[3] Thus, it is to be understood, that ‘consent’ was never given in initio.

Recent jurisprudence requires such reading

Recently, various jurisdictions, including Australia and Canada, have criminalized Non-Consensual Condom Removal, otherwise colloquially known as stealthing and holding it to amount to rape.^[4] To read gaslighting induced sexual acts as non-consensual is consistent with this growing jurisprudence which recognizes the utmost importance of the woman’s dignity, sexual autonomy and consent.

Conclusion

The abuse faced by such survivors cannot be discounted simply because the circumstances of that assault are unique in gaslighting cases. Gaslighting, by undermining autonomy, vitiates consent ab-initio. Thereby, any sexual relations which are resultant products of such emotionally perverse and conniving psychological maneuvers, must be held as sexual assault and the employers of the same ought to be held accountable and justly punished. Survivors of gaslighting deserve the legal protections afforded to other survivors of sexual assault.

[1] This article uses the colloquial term for gaslighting and does not advance it as a formal psychological diagnosis or concept. Gaslighting, Oxford English Dictionary, https://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/255554.

[2] Natascha Rietdjik, (You Drive Me) Crazy: How Gaslighting Undermines Autonomy (Master’s Thesis), Utrecht University, (June 22, 2018), file:///Users/quentinl8/Downloads/RMA%20Thesis%20Natascha%20Rietdijk.pdf.

[3] George A. Bermann and Etienne Picard, Introduction to French Law, (2008), https://books.google.co.in/books?id=2ULv4NzlAFEC&pg=PA213&lpg=PA213&dq=vices+du+consentement++Introduction+to+French+Law&source=bl&ots=JRP2aaYbMn&sig=ACfU3U0W3NdON5glXtP4MLCCf6Gl3C9muA&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjJ_tjpwNHnAhXLyDgGHbUbBG4Q6AEwAXoECAgQAQ#v=onepage&q=vices%20du%20consentement%20%20Introduction%20to%20French%20Law&f=false.

[4] Matthew Robinson, Police officer found guilty of condom ‘stealthing’ in landmark trial, CNN (December 10, 2018), https://edition.cnn.com/2018/12/20/health/stealthing-germany-sexual-assault-scli-intl/index.html; Alexander Lean, Drawing the Line: Deception and Sexual Consent, Journal of International and Public Affairs, https://www.jipasg.org/posts/2019/4/27/the-politics-of-controlling-labour-in-singapore-continuities-and-fissures-in-migrant-and-citizen-labour-governance; Brianna Chesser, Case in Victoria could set new legal precedent for stealthing, or condom removal during sex, The Conversation (August 16, 2019), https://theconversation.com/case-in-victoria-could-set-new-legal-precedent-for-stealthing-or-removing-condom-during-sex-118343; Alexandra Brodsky, “Rape-Adjacent”: Imagining Legal Responses To Nonconsensual Condom Removal, Columbia Journal of Gender and Law (2017), https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/D8708D06.

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