Written by Yazan Alhamdan.
On November 17th, 2025, the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) adopted Resolution 2803, which created and authorized the Board of Peace (“BoP”) to oversee a Gaza peace plan and establish an International Stabilization Force (“ISF”).1 The Board has raised significant debate on existing international legal conventions and international humanitarian law. The international community’s role is critical in bringing about the end of hostilities and reaching a long-term agreement that will allow Gaza to rebuild. However, the introduction of the Board of Peace raises concerns surrounding neutrality, respect for international legal conventions, and circumvention of United Nations-established charters.
Background and Context
On September 29th, 2025, Trump introduced a 20-point plan to end the war in Gaza. The points comprised a layered, three-phased plan of implementation that detailed a plan on governance, disarmament, and a new International Stabilization Force designed to act as a neutral buffer.2 On October 9th, 2025, with slight alterations, both Hamas and Israel signed onto the ceasefire agreement. The first round stipulated that Israel partially withdraw from the Gaza Strip, open the Rafah Crossing, and allow the entry of humanitarian aid.
The Board of Peace held its inaugural meeting on February 12 in Washington, D.C., where several countries announced financial contributions.3 But, since the meeting, the Board has made minimal progress towards establishing a long-term solution, and the Israeli government has continued its attacks on Gaza, killing 738 people by airstrike and thereby violating the terms of the ceasefire agreement.4
Questions About Self-Determination and the Board of Peace Mandate
One of the fundamental principles of the United Nations (“UN”) Charter, which establishes the foundations of international law, is the right to self-determination, as outlined in Articles 1 and 55. Self-determination is further affirmed as an inalienable right in the Declaration of the Principles of International Law (1970), passed by the UN General Assembly.5 UNSC 2803, however, places prerequisites on Palestinian sovereignty and self-determination.6 By restricting Palestinian statehood and self-determination, the agreement contradicts the existing UN principles outlined by the Charter. Because the Security Council’s resolutions are legally binding, this inconsistency threatens the Charter’s legitimacy.7
Many international legal experts have raised concerns about limitations on self-determination and emphasized that Palestinians possess the right to decide the future of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (“oPt”)’s reconstruction and development.8 The BoP’s conditioning of statehood within the U.S.-led plan for a long-term political solution violates the Palestinian people’s right to self-governance. The language of the UNSC 2803 agreement clearly highlights this lack of Palestinian participation, describing “a Trump economic development plan” for Gaza’s future that would be implemented by “convening a panel of experts.” While the mandate is currently set to expire at the end of 2027, Palestinian self-determination and statehood will become a prolonged uncertainty if it is extended.
Contradictions between the International Court of Justice and UNSC 2803
In December 2022, prompted by a UN General Assembly request, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) began investigating the long-term consequences of Israel’s prolonged occupation of the oPt. The ICJ Advisory opinion issued on July 19th, 2024, stated:
With regard to the Court’s finding that Israel’s continued presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory is illegal, the Court considers that such presence constitutes a wrongful act entailing its international responsibility. It is a wrongful act of a continuing character which has been brought about by Israel’s violations, through its policies and practices, of the prohibition on the acquisition of territory by force and the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people.9
The ICJ’s declaration that Israel’s presence is illegal in the oPt stands in stark contrast to UNSC 2803, which states that the BoP is authorized until Dec. 31, 2027. In addition, any reauthorization of the ISF must be in coordination with Egypt, Israel, and other member states, continuing to work with the ISF. This allows Israel to maintain its presence in the oPt, despite the ruling that this is in violation of international law. The resolution authorizes the ISF to coordinate with Israel on border security and permits the military to maintain its occupation of the Gaza Strip within a buffer zone. This nullifies the weight of the ICJ’s rulings and allows states to circumvent its jurisdiction by disregarding the advisory opinion provided on the dispute.
The ICJ, and numerous previous international agreements, have long recognized the oPt as a single territorial unit. The Board of Peace, however, includes the Palestinian National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, a transitional government at the lowest level of the BoP created to manage the administration of humanitarian aid and reconstruction.10 This structure separates Gaza’s administration from the rest of the oPt, further fragmenting Palestinian territory.
Lack of UN Oversight
Compared to the BoP, historical instances of UN territorial oversight avoided legal ambiguity by adopting similar international administrative structures that more closely conformed to norms within international organizations. In 1999, UNSC 1244 and UNSC 1274 established transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor. UNSC 1244, which sought to disarm the Kosovo Liberation Army, was similar in scope to that of UNSC 2803. However, the bodies authorized by both UNSC 1244 and 1274 in Kosovo and East Timor were UN Subsidiary organizations.11 This means that the organization’s mandates were formed within the UN system and relied on political and financial capital from the overarching system. Additionally, in the case of Kosovo, a clear exit strategy was developed, allowing for a reliable withdrawal without ambiguity.12
In contrast, the BoP is an effort led solely by U.S. President Donald Trump, who placed himself in the permanent position of Chairman. The disparate nature of the administrations presiding over these territories is significant, as UN subsidiary organizations operate more directly under the auspices of the UN and the Secretary-General. The BoP’s structure grants unchecked power to a single member state, and despite the participation of dozens of other UN members, decision-making remains concentrated within a small group of stakeholders. This violates the norms and principles established by the UN Charter, threatening its continued efficacy in modern international relations. Moreover, U.S. compliance can be avoided because of the veto power that the U.S. holds on the Security Council.
Conclusion
Since the Board of Peace’s first meeting in February, implementation of the agreement was put on hold due to regional conflict. Nevertheless, the present humanitarian crisis in Gaza requires critical attention. The BoP undermines the legitimacy of the UN Charter, contradicts ICJ advisory opinions, and departs from existing norms for transitional administrations established by the UNSC in past cases. Coupled with the limited effectiveness of the Board’s actions, these actions demonstrate that the international community must adopt a new strategy that respects international law, allows for wide-ranging international cooperation, and centers Palestinian decision-making and community input to ensure respect for sovereignty.
- S.C. Res. 2803, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2803 (Nov. 17, 2025). ↩︎
- The New York Times (2025), Here Is the Full Text of the Gaza Plan Released by the White House https://www.nytimes.com/2025/09/29/world/middleeast/gaza-israel-cease-fire-plan-text.html. ↩︎
- See Trump’s Board of Peace meets: Who’s in, who’s out, what’s on the agenda, Al Jazeera (Feb. 18, 2026), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/2/18/trumps-board-of-peace-meets-whos-in-whos-out-whats-on-the-agenda. ↩︎
- Palestinians Across Gaza Unsafe Six Months on from Ceasefire Announcement, Says Türk, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. (Apr. 10, 2026), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/04/palestinians-across-gaza-unsafe-six-months-ceasefire-announcement-says-turk. ↩︎
- G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Oct. 24, 1970). ↩︎
- S.C. Res. 2803. ↩︎
- U.N. Secretariat, Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, art. 25, https://legal.un.org/repertory/art25.shtml. ↩︎
- UN Experts Condemn “Board of Peace,” Call for a Reparative, Rights-Based Approach to Reconstruction in Gaza, Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts. (Mar. 2, 2026), https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2026/03/un-experts-condemn-board-peace-call-reparative-rights-based-approach. ↩︎
- Legal Consequences Arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 2024 I.C.J. (July 19), https://www.icj-cij.org/node/204176. ↩︎
- Gaza 2026: Board of Peace and National Transitional Committee, CBP-10492, House of Commons Library (2026), https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-10492/. ↩︎
- The Security Council as Architect? Resolution 2803, the Board of Peace, and the Limits of Transition in Gaza, 29 ASIL Insights, no. 16 (Dec. 10, 2025), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/29/issue/16. ↩︎
- Qerim Qerimi, Imagining Gaza, Thinking Kosovo: The (De)similarities of UN Security Council Resolutions 2803 (2025) and 1244 (1999), Opinio Juris (Mar. 17, 2026), https://opiniojuris.org/2026/03/17/imagining-gaza-thinking-kosovo-the-desimilarities-of-un-security-council-resolutions-2803-2025-and-1244-1999/.
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