The Case for González: Constitutional Legitimacy in Venezuela’s Post-Maduro Transition

Julia Nguyen is a sophomore at Georgetown University Walsh School of Foreign Service, studying Global Business.

1. Introduction

On January 3, 2026, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro was captured in a United States (“U.S.”) military operation. ¹According to Matthew Olay of Pentagon News, “Trump said the U.S. will oversee Venezuela until a safe transition to a legitimate replacement for the deposed strongman can be identified.”² On January 4, U.S. President Donald Trump stated that his Administration plans to “run” Venezuela with the help of Delcy Rodríguez, Maduro’s vice president and now-interim President of Venezuela.³ The collaboration marks a sharp departure from Rodríguez’s prior opposition to Western influence in Venezuela. For example, in 2014, as foreign minister, Rodríguez reportedly berated envoys from the U.S. and the European Union (“EU”) and characterized Venezuelan protesters killed in paramilitary operations as “terrorists.” ⁴

Less than a week after Maduro’s capture, Rodríguez released a statement affirming that Venezuela was exploring the possibility of restoring diplomatic ties with the U.S.⁵ Since her installation, Rodríguez has reshuffled more than half of Maduro’s cabinet, approved an amnesty law and the release of political prisoners, and purged Maduro loyalists, most notably Tarek William Saab and Alfredo Ruiz.⁶ Though Rodríguez is apparently overhauling the Chavist government of Venezuela, the legal foundation of her appointment is faulty. One year ago, Maduro was sworn in for his third six-year presidential term after millions of Venezuelans voted against him, and data collected by the opposition suggested that his opponent, Edmundo González Urrutia, won by a landslide.⁷ Rodríguez’s installation rests on a shaky legal foundation because the Venezuelan Constitution compels recognition of González as the rightful president.

2. The Illegality of the Supreme Tribunal Ruling

In April 2026, the Venezuelan Supreme Tribunal of Justice ruled that swearing in Rodríguez did not amount to “a substantive decision on the definitive legal classification of the presidential vacancy (temporary or permanent),” preserving legal uncertainty.⁸ According to the Venezuelan Constitution, the Executive Vice President can assume temporary presidency for up to 90 days in the event of a temporary vacancy.⁹ After 90 days, the National Assembly can declare a permanent vacancy or extend the interim period for another 90 days.¹⁰ After 180 days, the Assembly is obligated to call elections within 30 days.¹¹ April 3 was the deadline for the Assembly to vote, and as of April 6, it had not done so.¹² Ronal Rodríguez, a researcher at the Venezuela Observatory in Colombia’s Universidad del Rosario, anticipates that the Assembly may use Good Friday or the way the days were counted as an explanation.¹³ Regardless, the Assembly’s failure to act by April 3 constitutes a direct violation of its constitutional obligations.

In addition to the National Assembly’s delay in labeling the status of Maduro’s vacancy, the Supreme Tribunal’s ruling may have been influenced by politics, which contradicts Article 254, which establishes the Judicial Power as “autonomous.”¹⁴ The Supreme Tribunal is historically aligned with Maduro, which may explain its hesitation to decide on the situation.¹⁵ According to Juan Carlos Apitz, dean of the Faculty of Legal Sciences at the Central University of Venezuela, labeling the situation would require constitutional electoral deadlines, especially if Maduro’s vacancy is deemed permanent.¹⁶ The Supreme Tribunal’s continued partiality toward Maduro goes against its duty to remain politically independent.

The second illegality lies in the Tribunal’s assertion of authority to classify the presidential vacancy. The precise wording of Article 234 of the Venezuelan Constitution is that “If the temporary unavailability continues for more than 90 consecutive days, the National Assembly shall have the power to decide by a majority vote of its members whether the unavailability to serve should be considered permanent.”¹⁷ The Tribunal’s ability to take this case represents an encroachment upon powers reserved for the National Assembly.

3. The Legitimate President of Venezuela

Further examination of the Venezuelan Constitution weakens the legal foundation of actions taken in Venezuela. Article 228 of the Constitution states: “The election of the President of the Republic shall be by universal suffrage by direct and secret ballot, in accordance with law. The candidate who has received a majority of the valid votes cast shall be proclaimed elected.”¹⁸ Evidence indicates that Maduro was not democratically elected: 1) Data collected by opposition leader María Corina Machado suggests that Maduro’s opponent, Edmundo González Urrutia, won the election by 67% while Maduro only won 30% of the vote.¹⁹ 2) Venezuela violated multiple international electoral standards, leading to international institutions such as the Carter Center to denounce the validity of the election results.²⁰ 

The questionable reliability of the election statistics violates the Constitutional criteria requiring a “majority of the valid votes” for the President to be elected.²¹ Moreover, Machado’s data represented 81% of all polls in Venezuela and suggested an overwhelming majority in favor of González, strengthening the case for its legitimacy.²² Per Article 228, González must be recognized as the winner. Therefore, the most constitutionally aligned course of action following Maduro’s removal would have been to install González as President.

An important qualification to consider is that, since late 2024, González has been living in exile in Spain.²³ Since then, he has made few comments on the power transitions in Venezuela and does not appear interested in taking over the presidency.²⁴ However, no clause in the Constitution specifically addresses removals like Maduro’s, leaving room for interpretation.

4. The Interim Government of Juan Guaidó (2019-2022)

In May 2018, Maduro won re-election for his second six-year term. Similar to the suppression of the opposition in 2024, opposition candidates were either banned from running, jailed, or fled the country in fear of being jailed.²⁵ The National Assembly did not recognize Maduro as the winner, so according to Article 138 of the Constitution, he had no authority as President.²⁶ On January 23, 2019, National Assembly President Juan Guaidó declared himself the leader of Venezuela.²⁷ His interim government required constitutional loopholes to declare the absence of a president.²⁸ Specifically, Guaidó took advantage of Article 233, which states that the National Assembly President should take charge if the President becomes “permanently unavailable” before assuming office.²⁹ The Assembly used Maduro’s illegitimacy to classify him as “permanently unavailable.”³⁰ In December 2022, the National Assembly voted Guaidó out of office due to governance failures, namely his inability to fully unseat Maduro. ³¹

While Guaidó’s interim government resembles a González presidency, key distinctions render González a stronger constitutional candidate. First, the National Assembly backed Guaidó, citing Article 138 and a loophole in Article 233. Unlike Guaidó, who was declared President after the National Assembly refused to recognize Maduro as the country’s leader, González’s legitimacy is recognized internationally based on empirical evidence and is clearly supported by Article 228 of the Constitution, as he is the statistical winner of the election. 

5. Conclusion

If we recognize Maduro as the legitimate leader of Venezuela, then Rodríguez’s installation could be considered constitutional, as it follows the procedures outlined in Article 234, delegating executive power to the Vice President in the event of a temporary vacancy. However, there are two legal issues. Firstly, the decision-making process regarding the legal classification of Maduro’s absence violates both the constitutional deadline for the National Assembly to vote and the separation of powers between the Assembly and the Supreme Tribunal. Secondly, and more importantly, Maduro’s legitimacy is questionable due to evidence suggesting falsified election results. Since Maduro may not have been the legitimate leader in the first place, the proceedings since his capture were unconstitutional.

Faithful adherence to the Venezuelan Constitution requires recognition of González as president. However, discourses surrounding the proceedings in Venezuela overlook this conclusion. If the United States intends to fulfill its commitment to finding a “legitimate replacement” for Maduro, it must address the underlying constitutional issue: the failure to recognize and empower the legitimate president-elect.

1.  Scott R. Anderson et. al, The global implications of the US military operation in Venezuela, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (January 7, 2026), https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-global-implications-of-the-us-military-operation-in-venezuela/. ↩︎
2.  Matthew Olay, Trump Announces U.S. Military’s Capture of Maduro, PENTAGON NEWS (January 3, 2026), https://www.war.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/4370431/trump-announces-us-militarys-capture-of-maduro/.
   ↩︎
3. Anderson et. al, supra. ↩︎
4. Simon Romero & Anatoly Kurmanaev, How Venezuela’s New Leader Went From Revolutionary to Trump’s Orbit, THE NEW YORK TIMES (January 10, 2026), https://www.nytimes.com/2026/01/10/world/americas/delcy-rodriguez-venezuela-economy-trump.html ↩︎
5. Id. ↩︎
6. Florantonia Singer, Delcy Rodríguez, three months as president of Venezuela under Trump’s watchful eye (April 6, 2026), https://english.elpais.com/international/2026-04-06/delcy-rodriguez-three-months-as-president-of-venezuela-under-trumps-watchful-eye.html ↩︎
7. Frances Robles, Venezuelan Election Denounced by International Monitoring Group, THE NEW YORK TIMES  (July 31, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/31/world/americas/venezuela-election-carter-center-democracy.html. ↩︎
8. Singer, supra. ↩︎
9.  Id. ↩︎
10. Id. ↩︎
11. Id. ↩︎
12. The Associated Press & Regina Garcia Cano, Venezuela’s Delcy Rodríguez remains acting president after her initial 90-day appointment expired, WECT NEWS (April 6, 2026), https://www.wect.com/2026/04/07/venezuelas-delcy-rodrguez-remains-acting-president-after-her-initial-90-day-appointment-expired/. ↩︎
13. Id. ↩︎
14. Venezuela Const. Art. 254, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Venezuela_2009. ↩︎
15. Robles, supra. ↩︎
16. Id. ↩︎
17. Venezuela Const. Art. 234. ↩︎
18. Venezuela Const. Art. 228. ↩︎
19.  Julia Nguyen, Condemnation of the 2024 Venezuelan Election Suggests Hope for International Institutions, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY UNDERGRADUATE LAW REVIEW (January 27, 2025), https://guulr.com/2025/01/27/condemnation-of-the-2024-venezuelan-election-suggests-hope-for-international-institutions/. 
    ↩︎
20. Id. ↩︎
21.  Venezuela Const. Art. 228. ↩︎
22. Robles, supra. ↩︎
23.  Alessandra Freitas, Venezuela’s quiet opposition leader: Why Edmundo González is on the sidelines of a power struggle, CNN (February 15, 2026), https://www.cnn.com/2026/02/15/americas/venezuela-edmundo-gonzalez-opposition-intl-latam. ↩︎
24. Id. ↩︎
25. Drew Wilson, Everything You Need to Know About Maduro, Guaidó and Venezuela, BYU POLITICAL REVIEW (March 24, 2022), https://politicalreview.byu.edu/march-2019/everything-you-need-to-know-about-maduro-guaido-and-venezuela. ↩︎
26.  Id. ↩︎
27.  Jeff Wallenfeldt & Britannica Editors, Juan Guaidó, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (March 28, 2026), https://www.britannica.com/biography/Juan-Guaido. ↩︎
28. Singer, supra. ↩︎
29. Wilson, supra. ↩︎
30.  Id. ↩︎
31. Wallenfeldt & Britannica Editors, supra. ↩︎