Maya Velgot is a freshman in the Georgetown University College of Arts & Sciences studying Government and History.
A January 2025 report revealed that Russian cybercriminals laundered over $6 billion through illicit cryptocurrency exchanges, violating anti-money laundering (AML) laws and international cybersecurity agreements.¹ The report also detailed that Russian cybercriminals had hacked Kazakh diplomatic entities, Italian government websites, and Ukraine’s cyber infrastructure, raising concerns under international law regarding state-sponsored cyberattacks.² Allegedly, these funds were used to finance paramilitary operations in Ukraine and evade taxation, which could violate U.S. financial crime laws.³
In response, the U.S. Treasury Department imposed harsher sanctions on Russian oligarchs and cybercriminals under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”).⁴ The IEEPA gives the President authority to regulate economic transactions during national emergencies, particularly when foreign entities threaten United States interests.⁵ Violations of these sanctions could lead to criminal liability, as seen in United States v. Zarrab, in which a Turkish businessman was prosecuted for evading U.S. sanctions.⁶ Russian cybercriminals engaging in similar activities could face comparable legal consequences if they attempt to bypass financial restrictions.
Despite these sanctions, reports suggest that Trump’s cabinet—particularly Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth—has halted offensive cyber operations against Russia.⁷ While both the Pentagon and Trump officials have denied this, an anonymous source reported to The Guardian that a March 2nd report indicated Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (“CISA”) analysts were verbally instructed to pause surveillance of Russian intelligence efforts.⁸ This has raised legal and national security concerns, as the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA Act of 2015) requires federal agencies to coordinate and share intelligence on cyber threats.⁹
Following the March 2nd report, CISA publicly denied the claims, stating that such allegations undermine national security.¹⁰ In a statement on X (formerly Twitter), CISA reaffirmed its mission to “defend against all cyber threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, including Russia.”¹¹
Despite this, contradictory reports and official denials continue to surface, leaving uncertainty about whether the United States has altered its cyber defense strategy.
Whether these actions reflect a policy shift or political maneuvering remains unclear. However, the implications of reducing cyber surveillance on Russian intelligence could have serious consequences for U.S. national security and international cybersecurity law enforcement. Future investigations may determine whether these decisions were lawful or politically motivated, further shaping U.S. cyber policy and legal accountability.
- United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209.
- Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations (Michael N. Schmitt ed., 2017).
- Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332 (2022).
- International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1708 (2022).
- United States v. Zarrab, 15 Cr. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).
- Anonymous Source, “Trump Administration Retreats in Fight Against Russian Cyber Threats,” The Guardian, Mar. 2, 2025, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/feb/28/trump-russia-hacking-cyber-security.
- Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2935.
- The Record, “CISA Responds to March 2 Report,” Mar. 3, 2025, https://therecord.media/cisa-says-it-will-continue-to-monitor-russian-cyber-threats.
- CISA Gov, “Statement on X,” Mar. 3, 2025, https://x.com/cisagov/status/1896360034160017551?s=46&t=u19CbogN0TP7iqFc4MlyEQ.
