Elise Bulman is a Sophomore in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service majoring in Global Business.
Whether drawn in by their allure, captivated by their brilliance, or enchanted by the dazzling array of hues they possess, there is no question that diamonds remain one of the most highly coveted treasures on Earth. As the second largest consumer of diamonds on the international stage, the United States’s purchases of this precious commodity total billions of dollars every year, channeling significant capital into the global gemstone market.1 Indeed, as an intrinsically valuable commodity, diamonds serve as both a hedge against inflation and a tool for speculation, important aspects in a market increasingly characterized by uncertainty. Yet, despite such attributes, these stones have remained shrouded in controversy, particularly over the past two decades, where significant concern has arisen regarding the export of so-called “Conflict Diamonds.”
Defined as stones whose profits are used to finance armed conflicts aimed at undermining internationally recognized governments, the extraction, export, and eventual sale of these gemstones has been associated with significant human rights violations, most notably in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone.2 While some progress has been made towards preventing the entry of conflict stones into the global market, the legal framework governing this issue remains notoriously murky. The material below will briefly evaluate the existing legal framework regarding this issue and propose a series of refinements to current case law.
Presented to “The International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”)” in 2002, the case of Sierra Leone v. The United Kingdom played a pivotal role in shaping the regulatory framework for conflict resources. While the case failed to result in a formal ruling, its proceedings underscored the urgent need for enhanced oversight within the diamond industry.3 Most vitally, this case contributed directly to the establishment of the Kimberley Process in 2003, a global initiative designed to ensure transparency in the diamond supply chain. Adopted by the European Union and eighty-six other participating countries, “The Kimberley Process Certification System (“K.P.C.S.”)” introduced robust protocols, mandating the issuance of valid “The K.P.C.S.” certificates to verify the origin of all exported diamond shipments, established mandatory border checks to ensure compliance and required field visits to both publicly and privately owned diamond mines.4 To this day, “The K.P.C.S.” remains the foremost mechanism for the regulation of conflict stones.
While undoubtedly an important step in the regulation of conflict-gemstones, the exact legal status of the Kimberley Process remains somewhat obscure. While the Kimberley Process represents a series of international regulations that are considered legally binding on participating countries, it is not classified as a treaty. This grey area represents one of the system’s major drawbacks and has created a series of loopholes that represent deeply seeded flaws. Potentially, the most serious of these uncertainties pertains to the mechanisms by which regulations are enforced.5 Due to uncertainties regarding their exact status within the framework of international law, Kimberley Process oversight bodies are often unable to directly impose sanctions. Instead, they rely on the political will of other participating countries or the decisions of “The United Nations Security Council (“U.N.S.C.”).” While in some cases this is sufficient, such as in the case pertaining to Margane Diamond Mines of Zimbabwe—many times, even if “The U.N.S.C.” invokes sanctions—enforcement remains challenging in practice. Such can be seen in the 2006 Liberian Diamond Sanctions. Despite a United Nations-issued embargo on diamonds—on the grounds of insufficient documentation—Liberia circumvented such sanctions by smuggling stones across porous borders into neighboring states, where they were sold and re-exported through official channels. Thus, when exported, the illicit origin of these stones was masked.6 A similar bypass occurred in 2013, where embargoed stones were smuggled from the Central African Republic into Zimbabwe, where their origin was falsely certified.7 Such situations are by no means uncommon, and currently, the Kimberley Process has flagged more than five counties for false certification.8 Magnified by the fact that only entire diamond shipments—not individual stones—are certified, often conflict diamonds are mixed with legitimate shipments, creating another significant barrier in the enforcement of international legal standards.
Given both the transatlantic nature of the gemstone trade and the major drawbacks of the existing legal framework, there is a need for a more robust certification system targeted toward individual stones and enshrined in international law. The recent development of laser inscription—wherein rough diamonds are stamped with a unique serial number—may provide an answer to the legal and ethical issues haunting the diamond industry. Reforming “The K.P.C.S.” to mandate laser inscription on the girdle of rough diamonds—so as to prevent being cut away during the polishing process—will enhance regulatory bodies’ ability to track these stones across borders. Such development will heighten accountability, prohibiting stones from leaving their country of origin without a valid stamp, thereby preventing the infiltration of conflict stones into legitimate shipments. The technology of laser inscription is relatively inexpensive and thus will be readily applied to developing economies. The process of unique-serial stamping must be enshrined into international law, not as precedent or protocol, but within a treaty. Such a treaty could pertain to the movement of conflict stones specifically or to the export of conflict minerals more broadly, potentially even being added to a treaty pertaining to the flow of capital across borders. Crucially, such a treaty must establish clear sanctions—extending not only to the movement of conflict stones but to rare-earth minerals more broadly—and should be ratified on both the international stage, through bodies such as the United Nations, and through regional intergovernmental bodies such as the European Union, the African Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Ratification of a certification system, augmented with clear tracking mechanisms for individual stones, establishes a clear standard for diamond trade and, by extension, allows for heightened enforcement of established regulations. Most importantly, such a process will increase transparency across the industry, bolster accountability for producers and consumers at all levels of the supply chain, and increase the reliability of rare-earth mineral investments on the open market.
- WTEx, Import value of diamonds worldwide in 2023 by leading country (in billion U.S. dollars), STATISTA, (August 19, 2024), https://www.statista.com/statistics/972965/global-diamond-imports-by-country/. ↩︎
- U.S. Department of State, Conflict Diamonds and the Kimberley Process, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, https://www.state.gov/division-for-trade-policy-and-negotiations/conflict-diamonds-and-the-kimberley-process. ↩︎
- Jeremy Ridgeway, Corruption in Sierra Leone: Consequences of British Colonization, JOURNAL OF GLOBAL JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY, p. 1-9, https://jgjpp.regent.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/CORRUPTION-IN-SIERRA-LEONE.pdf.
↩︎ - Audrie Howard, Blood Diamonds: The Successes and Failures of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone, and Zimbabwe, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW, p. 144-147, (Jan 01, 2015), https://journals.library.wustl.edu/globalstudies/article/560/galley/17399/view/. ↩︎
- Meike Schulte, Sreejith Balasubramanian, & Cody Morris Paris, Blood Diamonds and Ethical Consumerism: An Empirical Investigation, SUSTAINABILITY, (2021), https://www.mdpi.com/2071-1050/13/8/4558. ↩︎
- United Nations, Security Council Renews Arms, Travel Embargoes in Liberia for One Year, Diamond Restrictions for Six Months, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 1731, UNITED NATIONS, (Dec 20, 2006), https://press.un.org/en/2006/sc8916.doc.htm. ↩︎
- Global Witness, Central African Republic Diamonds: Not Ready for Sale, GLOBAL WITNESS, (Nov 11, 2014), https://www.globalwitness.org/en/blog/central-african-republic-diamonds-not-ready-sale/. ↩︎
- Kimberley Process, Enforcement, KIMBERLEY PROCESS, https://www.kimberleyprocess.com/enforcement. ↩︎
